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CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER*

Oceanic Pollution and The
Southern Ocean: Rethinking the
International Legal Implications for
Antarctica
INTRODUCTION
A popular and recurrent theme during the last decade has been that the
international community seems on the verge of impending natural resource
scarcities.' As one might expect, the stark portents of this profound
economic transition have fostered serious reconsideration by industrialists
and governmental policymakers alike about the possible opportunities in
exploring and exploiting living and non-living natural resources in untapped regions. Perhaps not surprisingly, foremost among the regions
speculated about as being lucrative for commercial development are the
world's oceans and the pristine continent of Antarctica.
At the same time, however, a growing sense of competing nationalism
pervades international relations. As cogently expressed by one commentator,
[There is increasing international pressure to exploit their [i.e., the
oceans' and Antarctica's] resources, and also to change their legal
status, in response to a newly articulated nationalism directed at areas
of the globe traditionally considered to be open to use by all nations.2
Yet, if past is prologue, these new nationalistic pressures, catalytically
propelled by the twin aspirations of industrial development and societal
modernization, strongly suggest a profound realization: inextricably linked
to the economic development process are the concomitant costs of nonrenewable resource consumption, attendant population growth, and widespread environmental degradation. In the absence of viable international
legal regimes for supervising and regulating natural resource development
*Assistant Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science, The George Washington
University.
1. See, e.g., L. BROWN, THE TWENTY NINTH DAY (1978); H. DALY, STEADY-STATE
ECONOMICS (1977); D. MEADOWS, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972); W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977); and B. WARD & R. DUBOS, ONLY ONE
EARTH (1972).
2. Charney, Introductionin THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES
(J. Chamey, ed. 1982). [Hereinafter cited as Chamey].
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in the oceans and Antarctica, these costs conceivably eventually could
negate for all the benefits gained by some. 3
Environmental pollution and resource depletion both are direct manifestations of growth conflicts in the planet's finite ecosystem. Accordingly, international law must operate efficaciously and expeditiously to
prevent further degradation of the earth's common spaces, especially the
oceans and Antarctica. Accepting this premise, the purpose of this article
is to examine the political, economic, and legal nuances associated with
pollution abatement for the marine environment and resource conservation/contamination prevention for the Antarctic ecosystem.
From this analysis and assessment, two chief aims are intended: first,
to make more clearly appreciated the geopolitical problems implicit in
global marine pollution and Antarctic resource exploitation, and second,
to place into bolder perspective the political challenges which international
law must confront if it is to operate more effectively in the coming years
to safeguard the earth's common space regions.
THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: RESTORATION,
LIMITATION AND PREVENTION
General Observations
In a real sense, the ocean environment constitutes a shared public good
or common resource. It does not belong to any person or State; it is
immune legally from private appropriation; and, it is available for use to
all peoples. In the spirit of this revelation, nearly four centuries ago, the
eminent Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, posited that the oceans comprised
the "Outer Sea." They were in his words,
that expanse of water which antiquity describes as the immense, the
infinite, bounded only by the heavens, parent of all things; the ocean
which the ancients believed was perpetually supplied with water not
only by fountains, rivers, and seas, but by the clouds, and by the
very stars of heaven themselves; the ocean which, although, surrounding this earth, the home of the human race, with the ebb and
flow of its tides, can be neither seized nor inclosed; nay, which rather
possesses the earth than is by it possessed. 4
3. Colin W. Clark expressed this point well nearly a decade ago when he observed,
Indeed, man's increasing capacity to seriously deplete the world's natural resources
appears to be reaching a critical stage; if this is not imminent for the nonrenewable
resources, it certainly appears so for many of the renewable ones. The problems of
environmental pollution that loom so large today, for example, often result from a process
of overexploitation of the regenerative capacity of our atmospheric and water resources.
Clark, The Economics of Overexploitation, 181 SCIENCE 630 (1974) (Footnotes omitted).
4. H. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM 37 (R. Magoffin trans. 1916).
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Today, the antithesis of Grotius' observations is true. Regrettably, since
1608, global interdependence, increased technological sophistication, and
the multifaceted dynamics of pervasive industrialization have rendered
the oceans conspicuously finite. The oceans have been transformed from
an aquatic meadow in equilibrium into a modem day "tragedy of the
commons. "5 Creeping nationalization over the oceans has spawned more6
extensive and intensive demands upon their environmental capacity.
Whereas man once served the oceans, today they serve him.
Paradoxically, the highly vaunted Grotian doctrine of the freedom of
the seas7 must in large measure bear the onus of responsibility for the
marine environment's progressive denigration. Literally exercising freedom of seas essentially has been tantamount to precluding any legal
conditions for rationally exploiting the oceans' bounty. That is, while
admittedly freedom of the seas preserves the common property distinction
of the ocean, it has been sinisterly perverted into breeding confusion,
waste, and conflict over appropriating and protecting marine resources.
Hence, not surprisingly, national governments increasingly have turned
to using the oceans as natural sinks for society's wastes. Pesticide runoffs,8
industrial effluents, 9 sewage outflows,'" oil discharge and spillage from
routine maritime transport," deliberate dumping of radioactive' 2 and other
5. The "tragedy of the commons" as a concept was initially articulated by William Forster Lloyd
in 1883, and referred to the common use by herders of a village green. That is, a common grazing
area benefitted all so long as the number of animals grazing did not exceed the land's carrying
capacity. Though a herdsman conceivably realized that it would be in everyone's interest for the
number of animals using the green to remain limited, there was no special incentive promoting
restriction of his animals. If he were to limit his animals, there was no assurance others would not
increase their herds at his expense. Thus, the sum of individual shepherds' decisions to maximize
their personal gains by increasing their own herd size would eventuate tragically into the ecological
destruction of the common green. See Lloyd, Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (1833),
reprintedin MANAGING THE COMMONS 8 (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 1977). For contemporary
applications of this notion, see Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 and
OPHULS, supra note 1, at 145-55.
6. See Teclaff, InternationalLaw and the Protectionof the OceansfromPollution, 40 FORDHAM
L. R. 529 (1972).
7. "Freedom of the Seas" as a legal principle simply affirms that the high seas are common
property and open to the use of all States. For general discussion of the concept, see M. WHITEMAN,
4 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 501-42 (1965) and Allen, Freedom of the Sea, 60 AM.
J. INT'L L. 814 (1966).
8. See generally, R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); K. MELLANBY, PESTICIDES AND
POLLUTION; and F GRAHAM, JR., SINCE SILENT SPRING (1970).
9. S. GERLACH, MARINE POLLUTION: DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 37-52 (1981).
10. Officer & Ryther, Secondary Seivage Treatment versus Ocean Outfalls: An Assessment, 197
SCIENCE 1056-60 (1977).
11. See generally, J. POTTER, DISASTER BY OIL (1973) and S. GERLACH, supra note 9,
at 53-70.
12. Between 1946 and 1970, the Atomic Energy Commission authorized dumping 14,000 Curies
(Ci) into the Pacific Ocean and 80,000 Ci into the Atlantic. Between 1951 and 1966, Great Britain
dumped 45,000 Ci of radioactive waste into the Atlantic. S. GERLACH, supra note 9, at 112.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 24

toxic wastes, 3 and atmospheric pollution fallout 4 are patent evidence of
man's gross intrusion into the ecological sanctity of Grotius' "Outer Sea."
Humans must realize, therefore, that the earth is a closed system, a
global biosphere in essence, to appreciate the need for effecting considerate management and legal regulation over the oceans' use or, stated
more appropriately, their ongoing abuse. A constant, reciprocal interrelationship transpires between human activities on land, in the air, and in
the water. Respective to this, the oceans comprise 71 percent of the
planet's surface area.' 5 Consequently their commercial utility becomes
readily apparent: the oceans furnish food, mineral and energy resources
for man's consumption; they provide integral conduits for transnational
transportation, commerce, and communication; they are a convenient
depository for wastes; they proffer renewable water supplies (through
desalinization processes); and, certainly not least, the oceans serve as the
habitat for those photoplankton which refurbish three-fourths of the earth's
oxygen supply.' 6 Notwithstanding the obvious intrinsic value of these
opportunities, within recent years economic and political institutions
spawned by industrialization have impacted deleteriously upon the oceans'
ecological salubrity. Done selfishly and myopically, this degradation can
be attributed principally to pronounced pollution of the marine environment.
13. Sebastian Gerlach, professor of Benthos Ecology at Kiel University, recently assessed the
gravity of toxic waste dumping on the high seas:
Oil spills irritate the tourist at the shore and send the bird ecologist to the barricades.
Unnoticed by the public, however, thousands of barrels with residue of chemical
production in various industrial nations have been dumped in the ocean. In 1968,
14,000 t [tons] of waste matter from pesticide plants on the Mississippi were dumped
into the Gulf of Mexico every month. This figure is just a fraction of the estimated
total of 330,000 t of pesticide waste matter that was dumped by the U.S.A. in various
ocean areas, together with 560,000 t of waste matter from oil refineries, 140,000 t
from the paper industry, 940,000 t of various waste matter and 2.7 million t of waste
acids (Fig. 35). Approximately 40 t of chlorinated hydrocarbons in this period were
dumped in the Atlantic every month by the Federal Republic of Germany. In the period
from 1963 to 1969, 38,000 barrels containing cyanide compounds, arsenic, and other
poisons from Great Britain were dumped. Containers repeatedly turned up in fishermen's nets, not only on the high seas but also in Dutch and German coastal water
areas. This gives rise to the speculation that some boat captains made quick money
by throwing the drums containing poison overboard shortly after leaving the harbor
and saved themselves the trip out to sea.
S. GERLACH, supra note 9, at 53.
14. See Atlas & Giam, Global Transport of Organic Pollutants:Ambient Concentrationsin the
Remote Marine Atmosphere, 211 SCIENCE 163-65 (1981) and Williston, Mercury in the Atmosphere, 73 J. GEOPHY. RES. 7051 (1968).
15. Of the earth's surface, some 361 million sq. km., or 70.8 percent, is covered by ocean water.
W. ANIKOUCHINE & R. STERNBERG, THE WORLD OCEAN 10 (1973).
16. See generally,W. MARX, THE FRAIL OCEAN (1967); The Ocean, 221 SCIENTIFIC AM.
(July 1969); D. ROSS, OPPORTUNITIES AND USES OF THE OCEAN (1980); and E. WENK,
JR., THE POLITICS OF THE OCEAN (1972).
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Vessel-Source Pollution
The radical rise in shipping volume ploughing the oceans since World
War 111 has carried with it an aggravated increase in vessel-source marine
pollution. As one expert stated, "As more and larger ships carry greater
amounts of hazardous cargo, the potential and consequences of accidents
have escalated accordingly."'" Perhaps most dramatic manifestations of
this liability were several sensational tanker accidents, in particular the
Torrey Canyon in 1967,'" the Argo Merchant in 1976,0 the Amoco Cadiz
in 1978,2" and most recently, the Spanish tanker Castillo de Bellvar in
discharge also
August 1983.22 Yet, intentional dumping and 2operational
3
have contributed significantly to the problem.
17. In 1960, approximately 36,000 ships weighing at least 100 gross registered tons (grt) and
totaling 125 million grt were available for transoceanic commerce. By the late 1970s, the world's
fleet had increased to 70,000, with a combined tonnage of 400 million grt. Regarding tankers, in
1954, the world fleet consisted of 3,500 vessels; by 1977 the number had increased to 7,000, and
their aggregate dead weight tons in the same period had grown from 37 million dwt to an astounding
340 million dwt. IMCO, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TANKER SAFETY AND
POLLUTION PREVENTION 2-4 (1978), cited in Schneider, Prevention of Pollutionfrom Vessels
or Don't Give Up the Ship in Charney, supra note 2, at 7, n. 1-5. See Comment, Post Torrey
Canyon: Toward a New Solution to the Problem of Traumatic Oil Spills 2 CONN L. REV. 632
(1970); McManus & Schneider, Shipwrecks, Pollution & the Law of the Sea, NATIONAL PARKS
& CONSERVATION MAGAZINE 10 (June 1977); and Tanker Pollution:An Ocean World Special,
OCEAN REPORTER (April-May 1978).
18. Schneider, supra note 17, at 8.
19. Huge Tanker in Dangeron Rocks Off Britain, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1967, at 79, Col. 6,;
Brown, The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon, 21 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 113 (1968); Utton,
Protective Measures and the Torrey Canyon, 9 BRIT. COLUM. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 613
(1968).
20. Kifner, Split Tanker Leaves 60-Mile Oil Slick Off Nantucket, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1576, at
1, col. 3.
21. Lewis, Oil From Wrecked Tanker Pollutes 70-Mile Stretch of Brittany's Coast, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 19, 1978, at 1, col. 3. The Amoco Cadiz disaster resulted in the spillage of 220,000 metric
tons of crude oil and 3,600 tons of bunker fuel off the Brittany Coast of France, and led to some
$2 billion in lawsuit claims lodged against Standard Oil of Indiana. Kiechel, The Admiralty Case
of the Century, 99 FORTUNE 79 (Apr. 23, 1979). In metric tons (mt), other substantial oil spills
between 1970 and 1980 involving tankers include the following vessels: Wafra (1971), 60,000 mt;
Sea Star (1972), 60,000 mt; Metula (1974), 50,000 mt; British Ambassador (1975), 45,000 mt;
Argo Merchant (1976), 29,000 mt; CarribeanSea (1977), 32,000 mt; and Adros Potria (1978),
45,000 mt. Vielvoye, Spills Worsen Problems in Global Oil Movements, 77 OIL & GAS J. 25,36
(June 25, 1979) (Chart). From 1962 through 1978, fifty-eight major spills from tankers were recorded,
with twenty-nine of those occuring between 1975-1978. Id. at 36 (Chart). For additional data on
pre-1975 oil spills, see generally SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, AN ANALYSIS OF OIL TANKER CASUALTIES: 1969-74, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978).
22. Oil Tanker Breaks Apart Off S. Africa, Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1983, at A17, col. 1. The
Spanish supertanker carrying 252,000 tons of crude broke up off the Atlantic coast of South Africa,
reportedly leaked 40,000 tons of crude, a "major threat" to the coastal region. Id.
23. The precise amount of petroleum annually discharged is unknown, but it is believed to be
significant. The National Academy of Science has estimated that 34.9 percent of all petroleum
hydrocarbons introduced into the oceans come from transportation sources. NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, PETROLEUM IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 6 (1975)(Chart).
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To curtail and to control more effectively vessel-source pollution, States
have worked together on a number of policymaking levels to develop
appropriate international law. Obviously, the broadest framework utilized
to shape standards for preventing vessel-source pollution has been shaped
by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
HI).24 Indeed, Part XII, a substantial portion of the proposed 1982 Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea,s contains measures intended to deter
pollution of the marine environment. 26 These measures are specifically
24. UNCLOS III has been an ongoing negotiation process since late 1973. For representative
accounts of the protracted proceedings, the contentious issues involved, and the attitudes ofparticipant
diplomats, see the following: Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparationfor the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974); Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 CaracasSession, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. (1975); Stevenson & Oxman,
The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. (1975); Oxman, The Third UnitedNationsConference
on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Session, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1977); Oxman, The
1977 New York Sessions, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979); Oxman, The Eighth Session (1979), 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980); Oxman, The Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 211 (1981);
Oxman, The Third UnitedNations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981), 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982).
25. Convention on the Law of the Sea and Resolutions I-IV (Working Paper 1, June 1982), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 61/122 (Oct. 7, 1982), reprintedin 21 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1261 (1982). [Hereinafter cited as UNCLOS III Convention (1982)]. For earlier versions of the draft treaty's text,
compare Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/W.P.
10 (1978); Revised Single Negotiating Text, 5 UNCLOS III Off. Rec. 125, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/W.P. 8 Rev. 1 (1976); and Informal Single Negotiating Text, 4 UNCLOS III Off. Rec. 137, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/W.P. 8 (1975).
26. UNCLOS III Convention (1982), supra note 25, at art. 194. In full, Article 194 would
mandate that:
1. States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent
with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means
at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavour
to harmonize their policies in this connection.
2. States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other
States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities
under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise
sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.
3. The measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution
of the marine environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed
to minimize to the fullest possible extent:
(a) the release of toxic, harmful, or noxious substances, especially those which
are persistent, from land-based sources, from or through the atmosphere or by
dumping;
(b) pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents by
dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing
intentional and unintentional discharges, and regulating the design, construction,
equipment, operation and manning of vessels;
(c) pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation
of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, in particular measures for
preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation
and manning of such installations or devices;
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aimed at land-based sources,27 seabed activities,s dumping,29 and atmospheric sources,30 as well as vessel-sources.3 Though admittedly generalized, in tandem these provisions tend to reaffirm the international
(d) pollution from other installations and devices operating in the marine
environment, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with
emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design,
construction, equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices;
4. In taking measures to prevent, reduce or control pollution or the marine environment, States shall refrain from unjustifiable interferences with activities carried out by
other States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in conformity
with this convention.
5. The measures taken in accordance with this Part shall include those necessary to
protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.
27. Id. art. 207. See notes 56-69 infra.
28. Id. art. 208, 209.
29. Id. art. 210.
30. Id. art. 212.
31. Id. art. 211. To the extent that international law pertaining to vessel-pollution is codified
generally for the international community, this provision is most noteworthy. Accordingly, once the
UNCLOS IMITreaty enters into force, Article 211 in full will stipulate that:
1. States, acting through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference, shall establish international rules and standards to prevent, reduce
and control pollution of the marine environment from vessels and promote the adoption,
in the same manner, wherever appropriate, of routing systems designed to minimize
the threat of accidents which might cause pollution of the marine environment, including the coastline, and pollution damage to the related interests of coastal States.
Such rules and standards shall, in the same manner, be re-examined from time to time
as necessary.
2. States shall adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution of the marine environment from vessels flying their flag or of their registry.
Such laws and regulations shall at least have the same effect as that of generally
accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference.
3. States which establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign
vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their off-shore terminals shall
give due publicity to such requirements and shall communicate them to the competent
international organization. Whenever such requirements are established in identical
form by two or more coastal States in an endeavour to harmonize policy, the communication shall indicate which States are participating in such co-operative arrangements. Every State shall require the master of a vessel flying its flag or of its registry,
when navigating within the territorial sea of a State participating in such co-operative
arrangements, to furnish, upon the request of that State, information as to whether it
is proceeding to a State of the same region participating in such co-operative arrangements and, if so, to indicate whether it complies with the port entry requirements of
that State. This article is without prejudice to the continued exercise by a vessel of its
right of innocent passage, or to the application of article 25, paragraph 2.
4. Coastal States may, in the exercise of their sovereignty within the territorial sea,
adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution
from foreign vessels, including vessels exercising the right of innocent passage. Such
laws and regulations shall, in accordance with Part II, section 3, not hamper innocent
passage of foreign vessels.
5. Coastal States, for the purpose of enforcement as provided for in section 6, may
in respect of their exclusive economic zones adopt laws and regulations for the pre-
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rights and responsibilities embodied in Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration:32
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.33
vention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to and giving
effect to generally accepted international rules and standards established through the
competent international organization or general diplomatic conference.
6. (a) Where the international rules and standards referred to in paragraph 1 are
inadequate to meet special circumstances and coastal States have reasonable grounds
for believing that a particular, clearly defined area of their respective exclusive economic zones is an area where the adoption of special mandatory measures for the
prevention of pollution from vessels is required for recognized technical reasons in
relation to its oceanographical and ecological conditions, as well as its utilization or
the protection of its resources and the particular character of its traffic, the coastal
States, after appropriate consultations through the competent international organization
with any other States concerned, may, for that area, direct a communication to that
organization, submitting scientific and technical evidence in support and information
on necessary reception facilities. Within 12 months after receiving such a communication, the organization shall determine whether the conditions in that area correspond
to the requirement set out above. If the organization so determines, the coastal States
may, for that area, adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution from vessels implementing such international rules and standards or navigational practices as are made applicable, through the organization, for special areas.
These laws and regulations shall not become applicable to foreign vessels until 15
months after the submission of the communication to the organization.
(b) The coastal States shall publish the limits of any such particular, clearly
defined area.
(c) If the coastal States intend to adopt additional laws and regulations for the
same area for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels, they
shall, when submitting the aforesaid communication, at the same time notify the
organization thereof. Such additional laws and regulations may relate to discharges or
navigational practices but shall not require foreign vessels to observe design, construction, manning or equipment standards other than generally accepted international rules
and standards; they shall become applicable to foreign vessels 15 months after the
submission of the communication to the organization, provided that the organization
agrees within 12 months after the submission of the communication.
7. The international rules and standards referred to in this article should ihiclude
inter alia, those relating to prompt notification to coastal States, whose coastline or
related interests may be affected by incidents, including marine casualties, which
involve discharges or probability of discharges.
UNCLOS II Convention (1982), supra note 25, art. 211.
32. REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972). The text of the Declaration is reprinted in 11 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1416 (1972). Also see Joyner & Joyner, Global Eco-Management and InternationalOrganizations:The Stockholm Conference and Problems of Cooperation, 14 NAT. RES.
J. 533 (1974); Sohn, The Stockholm Declarationon the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 423 (1973); and Handl, The Environment: InternationalRights and Responsibilities, 74 PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC'TY INT'L L. 223 (1980).
33. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 32, Principle 21.
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More pointedly pertinent to vessel-source pollution, Principle 7 of the
same instrument provides that:
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the sea by
substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere
with other legitimate uses of the sea.'
Thus, the international community had deemed pollution of the oceans,
including that attributable to shipping activities, to be a priority concern
for enhancing the health of the human habitat.
On a somewhat more limited multilateral level, several landmark agreements have been negotiated and opened for signature, e.g., inter alia,
the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,35
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,36 the 1969 International
Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties,3 7 the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 38 the 1972 Convention of the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,39 and the
1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. 4
Similarly, at the regional level, States have undertaken specific negotiations to establish vessel anti-pollution law. For the Northeast Atlantic
area, eight littoral States 4' are signatories to the 1969 Agreement Con34. Id., Principle 7.
35. May 12, 1954 [1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S.3; with amendments
adopted April 11, 1962 [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332; Oct. 21,
1969 [1977] 1 U.S.T. 1207, T.I.A.S. No.8505; Oct. 15, 1971, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 267 (1972).
36. April 29, 1958 [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 327 U.N.T.S. 3. Of salient note,
three additional international agreements were direct products of the 1958 Geneva Conference on
the Law of the Sea, vis., the: Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958 [1964] 1 U.S.T.
47 1, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958 [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599 U.N.T.S.
285; and Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958 [1964] 2 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
37. Nov. 29, 1969, [1975] 1 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068.
38. Nov. 29, 1969, reprintedin 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45 (1970). See also Protocol to
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1976, in 16
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 617 (1977).
39. Dec. 29, 1972, [1975] 2 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165. See generally,Leitzell, The Ocean
Dumping Convention-A Hopeful Beginning, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 502 (1973) and McManus,
Ocean Dumping: Standard in Action, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 119 (D. Kay & H. Jacobson, eds. 1983).
40. Nov. 2, 1973, reprintedin 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973). In 1978, a protocol
was added in response to the numerous tanker accidents during the two years prior. See Protocol of
1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Feb.
16, 1978, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 546.
41. Namely, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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ceming Pollution of the North Sea by Oil. 42 In 1974, seven Baltic States 43
adopted an anti-pollution treaty, the Convention on the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea area (Helsinki Convention).' The
treaty covered marine pollution caused by vessels, and also pollution
which stemmed from activities on land, the seabed, and in the air. In
1976, eighteen countries 45 bordering on the Mediterranean hammered out
the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona Convention)46 and two supplementary protocols. 47 Finally, the littoral States along the Persian Gulf, under the auspices of the
United Nations Environmental Program, adopted the Kuwait Regional
Convention for Co-operation in the Protection of the Marine Environment
from Pollution in 1978. 48
Transnational cooperation at anti-vessel source pollution has been augmented by national efforts as well. Yet, although most industrialized
coastal states have passed such legislation,4 9 Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970"0 and the United States' Clean Water Act
of 19775" retain especial importance in demonstrating the need for and
far-reaching implications of these national acts.
Though this proliferation of multilateral instruments and concomitant
national legislation may seem impressive, it nevertheless fails in filling
some blatant lacunae in present marine environmental law: relatively
42. June 9, 1969, reprintedin 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 359 (1970).
43. Namely Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Sweden, and the Soviet Union.
44. March 22, 1974, reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 544 (1974). For an insightful
analysis, see Boczek, InternationalProtection of the Baltic Sea EnvironmentAgainst Pollution, 72
AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1978).
45. Namely, Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya,
Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Save for Syria, all signed
the agreement, which entered into force February 12, 1978.
46. Feb. 16, 1976, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 290 (1976). For pertinent
discussion, see Boxer, MediterraneanAction Plan:An Interim Evaluation, 202 SCIENCE 585 (Nov.
1978).
47. Protocol on Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and
Aircraft, and the Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combatting Pollution of the Mediterranean
Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, reprintedin 15 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 300, 306 (1975).
48. April 23, 1978, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 511 (1978).
49. See e.g., the pieces of national legislation enumerated in Hayaski, Comparative National
Legislation on Offshore Pollution, I SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 250 (1973).
50. CAN. REV. STAT. c.2 (1st Supp. 1970). For relevant analyses, see Bilder, The Canadian
Arctic Waters PollutionPreventionAct: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1970) and Dwivedi, The Canadian Government's Response to EnvironmentalConcern, 28 INT'L
J. 134 (1972-73).
51. Pub. L. No. 95-215, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1 1977)).
See Note, The Clean Water Act of 1977: Expanded Competence over Vessel-Source Pollution, 18
VA. J. INT'L L. 289 (1978).
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unrestricted resort to flags of convenience in shipping;52 ambiguities regarding the precise obligations and enforcement duties of states; 53 the
inherent difficulties of assigning responsibility and liability for environmental damage;54 and, certainly not unimportant, the fact that some of
the aforementioned international accords were unduly delayed or remain
not in force.55 This underscores the recognition that much still could be
done to protect the oceans from pollution effluents discharged from ships.
Land-Based Pollution
As averred earlier, the proliferation of human activities impinging upon
ocean space has brought about a detectable deterioration in the quality
of the earth's marine environment. In this respect, the relative gravity of
a pollutant's effects appears to depend upon four critical variables, viz.,
its (1) persistence level in the marine ecosystem, (2) degree of toxicity,
(3) concentration and locality of discharge, and (4) bioaccumulation potential.5 ' Not unexpectedly, recent scientific studies have concluded that
land-based pollution sources, located primarily in heavily industrialized
coastal cities and which appear principally as petroleum, 57 municipal
sewage,58 metallic effluents,59 chlorinated hydrocarbons," and radioactive
52. By resorting to flags of convenience, shipping owners may register their vessels with nations
having lower tax scales, lower minimum wages, and more lax safety requirements. See generally,
B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY (1962).
53. Handl, TerritorialSovereignty and the Problem of TraditionalPollution 69 AM J. INT'L L.
50 (1975).
54. Handl, State Liabilityfor Accidental TransnationalEnvironmentalDamage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1980).
55. The 1969 IMCO Convention, supra note 38, took six years to come into force, and the
London Dumping Convention, supra note 39, took three years. The 1973 Pollution from Ships
Convention, supra note 40, with its protocol did not enter into force jointly until October 1, 1983.
Not to be overlooked as well is that neither the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, reprintedin INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 959 (1975) nor its Protocol [Protocol
of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, Feb. 16, 1978,
reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 579 (1978)] have yet entered into force.
56. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 23.
57. Some estimates put petroleum components entering the oceans via the atmosphere to be as
high as 10 million tons annually. It is suspected, however, that most land-based oil reaches the
oceans by being washed into rivers with other domestic effluents from street sewers. Reliable
calculations put the total at 2.5 million tons per annum. S. GERLACH, supra note 9, at 81.
58. In 1973, it was reported that in the New York Bight (i.e., the area between Long Island,
N.Y. and New Jersey) 480 million gallons per day (mgd) of untreated wastewaters, 540 mgd of
primary treatment plant effluent, and 920 mgd of "intermediate" treatment effluent were being
discharged. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OCEAN DUMPING IN THE NEW
YORK BIGHT, FACTS AND FIGURES (1973). Gerlach notes that as much as 4 million cubic
meters, or 200,000 tons, of organic sewage sludge annually is dumped into the Bight area. S.
GERLACH, supra note 9, at 64. See Steimle & Sindermann, Review of Oxygen Depletion and
Associated Mass Mortalitiesof Shellfish in the Middle Atlantic Bight in 1976, 40 MAR. FISH REV.
19-26 (1978).
59. Copper, silver, mercury, lead, and cadmium are considered particularly toxic metals and the
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wastes, 6' exacerbate and compound greatly the problem of marine pollution.62 Admittedly alarmed by these potential dangers during the 1970s,
some nations legislated controls for land-based pollution sources, especially those States bordering on semi-enclosed sea basins and those having
heavily concentrated industrial cities on their coasts. 63 Notwithstanding
these efforts, restoring the oceans' environment and preventing it from
further pollutant degradation has been seriously hampered, and indeed
impeded, by the dearth of available scientific data. In this connection,
one analyst has observed:
latter three have sufficiently polluted the marine environment to be of global concern. Bryan, Heavy
Metal Continuation in MARINE POLLUTION (R. Johnson ed. 1976). See generally ASSOC.
EUROPEANNE OCEANIQUE, METALLIC EFFLUENTS OF INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN IN THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT (1977). Between 1953 and 1975, 798 persons from the town of Minamata, a fishing village in Japan, were diagnosed as having Mercury poisoning. The cause for this
so-called "Minamata Disease" was eventually traced to the Shin Nikon Chisso Hiryo Company,
which had been discharging methylmercury into the bay. See MINAMATA, A WARNING TO THE
WORLD (W. Smith & A. Smith eds. 1975).
60. Chlorinated hydrocarbons constitute a major pollution hazard due to their longevity and
extreme toxicity to marine organisms. Among these types of chemical compounds constantly entering
the marine ecosystem are diclorethane, vinylchloride, carbontetrachloride, polychlorinated bipheyles
(PCB's), and the ubiquitous insecticide, dichlorodiphenyl trichlorelthane (DDT). See generally, E.
GOLDBERG, THE HEALTH OF THE OCEANS (1976); U.S. NATIONAL RESOURCES COUNCIL, CHLORINATED HYDROCARBONS IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT (1971); and R.
SHINN, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MARINE POLLUTION (1974).
61. Although radioactivity occurs naturally in the marine environment, processing plants and the
dumping of radioactive wastes have introduced manifold additional amounts into the oceans. Disposal
of radioactive isotopes, e.g., plutonium-239, strontium-90, and caesium-137, comprise the principal
concern. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, ASSESSING POTENTIAL OCEAN POLLUTANTS (1975); Woodhead, Levels of Radioactivity in the Marine Environment and the Dose
Commitment to Marine Organisms in RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT 499-535 (Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, 1973); and GERLACH, supra note 9, at
104-19.
62. In assessing the gravity of reaching viable solutions for curtailing land-based sources of
marine pollution, Robert McManus has observed:
One probable reason for the international community's hesitancy to grapple with
sources of land-based pollution is the stupefying scope of the problem. Except for
discharges from ships and offshore drilling rigs, the rubric "land-based sources" includes virtually all modes of contamination of the world's ocean. It includes, for
example, all outfalls, both coastal and inland, into the oceans or into agricultural runoff
(with special reference to that containing pesticides). And it includes atmospheric
fallout and wash-out-for example, of unburned hydrocarbons from automobiles. It
even includes "ocean dumping"-that is, ocean transport of wastes produced on land
for the sole purpose of getting rid of them. Although this subject was dealt with by a
widely accepted treaty in 1972, it represents an arbitrary subdivision of a broader
problem, in order to permit politically realistic international agreement. In fact, restrictions on ocean dumping should be based, at least in part, on the control strategy
applicable to all other wastes produced on land.
McManus, Legal Aspects of Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution, in Charney, supra note 2, at
90-91 (footnote omitted).
63. Whipple, Jr., Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution and National Controls in Chamey,
supra note 2, at 47-49. Preeminent among these countries are the United States, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Great Britain, France and Japan. Id. at 50-57.
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The inadequate data base, the lack of standards by which to assess
damage to the marine environment, and the difficulties of obtaining
critical entry information fail to address yet another critical problem,
the difficulty of fashioning solutions: who shall be responsible for
data collection, interpretation, monitoring and detection, and ultimately issuing the warnings; and what are the responsibilities of
nations in assisting this process?'

Ostensibly, one near-term solution for alleviating this dearth of data acquisition would be widespread legal acceptance and implementation of
200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) seaward from coastal States.65
Presumably, adoption of EEZs could act as catalysts for promoting national pollution abatement policies and programs, as well as serve as
motivation for states to work toward preventing contamination of coastal
waters through stricter legislative curbs on the release of toxic effluents
into the marine ecosystem.
Nonetheless, creation of national EEZs should not be touted as an allencompassing legal panacea for land-based marine pollution. A perceived
need for some international regulatory mechanism and perhaps a uniform
liability register, as well, continue to persist to deal with pollution on
and in the "high sea" areas of the oceans.' The Maritime Consultative
Organization (formerly the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, IMCO) has attempted, with some notable success, 67 to
address this need since the early 1950s. Yet, one must realistically conclude that "a workable international scheme for the abatement of land64. Kildow, Political and Economic Dimensions of Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution in
Chamey, supra note 2, at 74.
65. As articulated in the 1982 UNCLOS III Convention, the exclusive economic zone is an area
extending seaward not more than 200 nautical miles (Article 57) in which the coastal State has:
a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil
and the superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds;
b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this convention with regard
to:
i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
ii) marine scientific research;
iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
UNCLOS III Convention (1982), supra note 25, art. 56.
66. McManus, supranote 62, at 104-108.
67. See Schneider, supra note 17, at 10-12. Cf. Greenberg, IMCO: An Environmentalist'sPerspective, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 131 (1976) and Sielen & McManus, IMCO and The Politics
of Ship Pollution in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
(H. Jacobson & D. Kay eds. 1983). IMCO's early efforts prompted some commentators to believe
it would have a viable role in regulating ocean law. See Joyner & Joyner, PrescriptiveAdministrative
Proposal:An InternationalMachineryfor Control of the High Seas, 8 INT'L LAWYER 57 (1974).
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based sources of marine pollution could be adopted and implemented
only after formidable political obstacles had been overcome." ' 68 Given
the current climate of ascendant nationalism vis-A-vis strategies of acquiring natural resources, it appears dubious at best that States today
would demonstrate sufficient political will for surrendering more of their
sovereignty to an international marine-pollution regulatory regime.
Determination of whether present and future international agreements
will be adequate for precluding effectively the world's oceans from succumbing eventually to man-induced toxic collapse remains relegated to
the vicissitudes of time. Nonetheless, integrally affected by the outcome
of this process will be the environmental conditions in Antarctica and its
circumpolar waters. Accordingly, the study now turns to examine the
economic, political, and legal ramifications which resource exploitation
could portend for the Antarctic region's environs.
THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: PROTECTION,
PRESERVATION AND CONSERVATION
General Observations
Little doubt persists that an international law for regulating pollution
of the global environment generally,69 and that of the oceans in particular,7"
is well into the process of evolution and acceptance. Nonetheless, this
''conventional" source of law has proved to be somewhat ponderous and
protracted vis-A-vis State implementation and practice. For Antarctica's
regional environs, proceeding commercially with resource exploration
and exploitation could render international controls for protecting the
environment there too little, too late, or perhaps in the long term, even
nugatory.
Antarctica is a continent of meteorological, 7 topological72 and ecological73
extremes. Geological evidence has suggested that Antarctica 200 million
68. McManus, supra note 62 at 107.
69. See generally, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION (J. Barros & D. Johnson
eds. 1974); LAW, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (J. Hargrove ed. 1972);
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1974); and ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 39.
70. See, e.g., Teclaff, InternationalLaw and the Protection of the Oceansfrom Pollution, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 69, at 104; Caflisch, Some Aspects of
Oil Pollutionfrom Merchant Ships, 4 ANNALES D'ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 213 (1973);
Moore, LegalAspects of Marine Pollution Control in MARINE POLLUTION 589 (R. Johnston ed.
1976); and Goldie, InternationalPrinciplesof Responsibilityfor Pollution, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283 (1970).
71. Antarctica's weather and climate is dominated by low temperatures, intense winds, and little
precipitation. The mean temperature on the high interior polar plateau of East Antarctica approximates
- 60°C, although temperatures in coastal areas are less severe. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, POLAR REGIONS ATLAS 37 (1979). The coldest temperature ever recorded on earth
was at the Soviet Union's station Vostock, where on August 24, 1960, the temperature fell to - 88°C
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years ago may have been part of a supercontinent known as Gondwan75
aland.74 If this situation actually occurred, rich deposits of minerals
discovered in present day South America, Africa, India, and Australia
conceivably could exist in similar quantities in Antarctica as well.76 While
these speculations thus far have proved to be unfounded, 7 7 and while
Antarctica seems unlikely to make any noteworthy contribution to world
supplies of hard minerals in the near or foreseeable future, 7 the com(- 127°F). INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
FUTURE OF ANTARCTICA (Earthscan Press Briefing Doc. No. 5 1978), reprintedin Exploitation
ofAntarcticResources:Hearingbefore the Subcomm. onArms Control, Oceans, andthe International
Environment of the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 34 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Antarctic Resources Hearing]. Steady katabatic wind blasts averaging 100 km per hour are
not infrequent during the winter (i.e., in July). Bertrand, Antarctica, 43 FRONTIERS 9 (1978).
Annual snow precipitation of less than 5 cm of water equivalent qualifies Antarctica as a frozendesert. Bull, SnowAccumulation in Antarctica,in RESEARCH IN THE ANTARCTIC 367 (L. Quam
ed. 1971).
72. Nearly 98 percent of Antarctica's 5,700,000 square miles is covered by a sheet of ice with
an average thickness of one mile, and a maximum of three miles. Antarctic Resources Hearing,
supra note 71, at 198. In addition, Antarctica not only is the most isolated of the continents, it also
has the highest average elevation, approximately 6000 feet above sea level. P. JESSUP & H.
TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 138
(1959).
73. The Antarctic continent contains no land vertebrates and is the only continent without shrubs
or trees. Only two plant species are indigenous, making mosses and lichens the principle plant life.
Lamb, Antarctic Terrestrial Plants and Their Ecology, in 2 ANTARCTIC ECOLOGY 737 (M.
Holdgate ed. 1970). Only a single river, the Onyx in the Ross Dependency, flows in the summerover a course of less than 50 miles. Warm WeatherAids Onyx River Flow, 9 ANTARCTIC 49 (1980).
Finally, in ice-free locations, soils are generally underlain by permafrost. Moreover, given their lowtemperature, low moisture, and non-microbial content, they assume the quality of cold desert soil
formations. J. TEDROW, SOILS OF THE POLAR LANDSCAPES 518 (1977).
74. See Elliot, Tectonics of Antarctica:A Review, 275 AM. J. SCI. 45-106 (1976); Craddock,
Antarctic Geology and Gondwanalandin FROZEN FUTURE 101 (R. Lewis & P. Smith eds. 1973);
and Antarctic Resources Hearing, supra note 71, at 205.
75. Accepting the Gondwanaland thesis, four primary areas in Antarctica potentially could contain
mineral-bearing deposits: 1) the Antarctic peninsula (copper and molybdenum); 2) the Dufek Massif
(chromium, platinum, copper, and nickel); 3) the Transantarctic Mountains (copper, lead, zinc,
silver, tin, and gold); and the Prince Charles Mountains (iron). Zumberge, PotentialMineralResource
Availability and Possible EnvironmentalProblems in Antarctica, in Chamey, supra note 2, at 127.
76. Other trace minerals conceivably also recoverable in Antarctica include vanadium, cobalt,
uranium, manganese, and coal. MINERAL RESOURCES OF ANTARCTICA 39 (U.S. Geological
Survey Circular 705, N. Wright and P. Williams eds. 1974). But see text and note 78 infra.
77. See G. Schatz, Antarctic Myths and the Quality of Policy Discourse (Sept. 28, 1977)(unpublished
paper).
78. Professor James Zumberge expressed well the current scientific appraisal of Antarctica's hard
mineral potential when he asserted:
Minerals ... have already been dicovered, but no ore deposit of economic grade or
volume has been identified. Moreover, even if a significant deposit were discovered,
the costs of extraction, concentration, and shipment to market are likely to prohibit
any serious mining venture for one or two generations. There is a good possibility
that no mineral resources on land will be mined in the foreseeable future, if ever.
Zumberge, supra note 75, at 127. This assessment has been echoed by Dr. Giulio Pontecorvo as he
averred:
We conclude that, based on what is currently known about the supply of minerals
elsewhere, market prices, and production costs, the probability is close to zero that
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mercial opportunities for exploiting possible hydrocarbon deposits offshore may be more optimistic.79 Closely related to this, the Antarctic
marine ecosystem teems with living resources,8" paramount among which
is a shrimp-like crustacean, krill."t Recent studies suggest that these living
under market conditions (rational decisions with no subsidies), nonliving resources in
Antarctica will be exploited within a finite time horizon of twenty years, and probably
for a much longer period.
In all cases of nonliving resources, with the possible exception of petroleum in some
future period, there are alternative sources of supply in more accessible, less hostile
locations. (Again, it is desirable to weigh this conclusion against the low probability
of some unique discovery.) Unless one is willing to deny the role of price and substitution in the markets for minerals and to assume further that the demand for and
real price of minerals will behave differently than they have for the past century, there
are no economic resources on the Antarctic continent.
Pontecorvo, The Economics of the Resources of Antarctica in Charney, supra note 2, at 159, 162.
See also, Rowley, Williams, & Pride, Mineral Occurrencesof Antarctica, in PETROLEUM AND
MINERAL RESOURCES OF ANTARCTICA 25 (J. Behrendt ed. 1983) (U.S. Geological Survey
Circular 909). As the authors conclude, "Nearly all mineral occurrences are small and isolated, and
presently have no commercial importance ....
It is doubtful ... that any metallic or nonmetallic
mineral resources in Antarctica will be exploited for many years, unless world economic or political
conditions change drastically." Id. at 43.
79. See Mclver, Hydrocarbon Gases in Canned Core Samples from Leg 28 sites 271, 272 and
273, Ross Sea, in 28 INITIAL REPORTS OF THE DEEP SEA DRILLING PROJECTS 815 (D.
Hayes & L. Frakes eds. 1975) and Auburn, Offshore Oil and Gas in Antarctica, 22 GER. Y. B.
INT'L L. 139 (1977). Also see Behrendt, Are There Petroleum Resources in Antarctica?, in PETROLEUM AND MINERAL RESOURCES OF ANTARCTICA, supra note 78 at 3. Professor
Behrendt concludes:
Although no petroleum resources are known in Antarctica and the petroleum industry
is not particularly interested at present, economic and political considerations may
change the industry's interest in the next few years, and exploration and exploitation
are possible within one or two decades. A number of countries [i.e., the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, West Germany, Norway, Japan, and France] are actively carrying out
multi-channel seismic reflection surveys of the Antarctic continental margin,. . . which
are obviously focused on petroleum resource studies. Technology development will
probably occur at a more rapid rate than research, exploration, and legal development.
Id. at 22 (footnotes omitted).
80. Found in Antarctica's circumpolar waters are significant numbers of fin fish, squid, whales,
seals, penguins, and birds. For appropriate treatments of these resources, see EI-Sayed, Biology of
the Southern Ocean, in OCEANS 46-47 (Summer 1975); Llano, Ecology of the Southern Ocean
Region, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 357 (1978), I. Everson, The Living Resources of the Southern
Ocean, U.N. Doc. UNDP/FAO GLO/SO/77/1 (1977); Scully, The Marine Living Resources of the
Southern Ocean, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341 (1978); Laws, The Significance of Vertebrates in the
Antarctic Marine Ecosystem, in ADAPTATIONS WITHIN ANTARCTIC ECOSYSTEMS 411 (G.
Llano ed. 1977); and ANTARCTIC RESOURCES HEARING, supra note 71.
81. Krill, the principal species of which is Euphausia superba, range in size from 10 to 50
millimeters and form dense swarms in wide distributions throughout the Southern Ocean. Laws,
supra note 80, at 414. Krill is believed to be the primary food for other Antarctic marine organisms,
and is a vital link in the region's ecosystemic food chain. K. GREEN, ROLE OF KRILL IN THE
ANTARCTIC MARINE ECOSYSTEM 18 (1977); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A POSSIBLE REGIME FOR CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RESOURCES (1978), at App. C.; TETRA TECH, THE ANTARCTIC
KRILL RESOURCES: PROSPECTS FOR COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION 121 (1978); and B.
MITCHELL & R. SANDBROOK, THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SOUTHERN OCEAN, at
Section 4, (1980).
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fishery resources could furnish substantial amounts of protein to meet the
world's increasing food needs.82 These prospects notwithstanding, given
man's baneful experience in the recent past with the, oceans, serious
environmental problems obviously could result from uncontrolled ex-

ploitation of either non-living or living resources in the Antarctic-Southern
Ocean region. Not discounting difficulties of technological feasibility, 3
the critical question for consideration then becomes who has a legal right
in Antarctica to exploit which resources, in what quantities, and for whose
benefit?
The Contemporary Legal Status ofAntarctica
The Antarctic Treaty Regime
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 created the legal regime presently overseeing the conduct of activities south of 60 degrees South latitude.8 4 The
Treaty emerged in the aftermath of the International Geophysical Year
(IGY)(1957/58) 85 and the success achieved at scientific cooperation then
among twelve participant nations. Argentina, 6 Australia,87 Chile,88 France, 89
82. Initial suggestions put the annual sustainable yields of krill at 150 million tons. TETRA
TECH, supra note 82, at 121. However, recently, more conservative estimates suggest that 10 million
tons would be a safer level to avoid serious ecological repercussions or numerous risks to krill stocks
or dependent species. Bogdanov, cited in B. MITCHELL & R. SANDBROOK, supra note 81, at
106. Given that the annual fish catch is only approximately 70 million tons, krill would greatly
supplement human demand for animal protein. Mitchell, The Politics ofAntarctica, 22 ENVIRONMENT 13 (1980). Also see G. GRAHAM, THE UTILIZATION OF KRILL (1977).
83. See Zumberge, supra note 75, at 130-40.
84. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered
into force June 23, 1961). The Treaty has received considerable scholarly attention internationally
over the past twenty years. See, e.g., Rene-Jean Dupuy, Traite sur rantarctique,6 ANNUAIRE
FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL nI (1960); Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty, 9 INT'L
& COMP. L. Q. 436 (1960); Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 349
(1960); Simmonds, The Antarctic Treaty, 1959, 87 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 668
(1960); van der Essen, Le probleme politico-juridiquede l'Antarctique et le Traite de Washington
du ler decembre 1959, 80 ANNUAIRE DE DROIT ET DES SCIENCES POLITIQUE (1960);
Mouton, The InternationalRegime of the PolarRegions, [1962 III] 107 RECUEIL DES COURS
175; A. SCILINGO, EL TRATADO ANTARTICO (1963); G. BATTAGLINI, LA CONDIZIONE
DELL' ANTARTIDE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONAL (1971); C. BEEBY, THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY (1972); GUYER, TheAntarctic System [1973 III] 139 RECUEILDES COURS 149; Barrie,
The Antarctic Treaty: Example of Law and Sociological Infrastructure, 8 COMP. & INT'L L. J.
SO. AFRICA, 212 (1975); Wassermann, TheAntarctic Treaty andNaturalResources, 12 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 174 (1978); and F. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 84-204 (1982).
85. For relevant discussion of the IGY, see Jones, The Inception and Development of the InternationalGeophysical Year, I ANNUAL OF THE IGY 393 (1959) and H. BULLIS, THE POLITICAL
LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR (1973).
86. Argentina's claim includes the pie-shaped sector between 25 degrees West and 74 degrees
West, bordered on the north by the 60th parallel of South latitude. While never officially issuing a
formal claims document, Argentina did publish Decree-Law No. 2191 of February 28, 1957, in its
Boletin Oficial (March 19, 1957), whereby it reestablished the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego,
the Antarctic and the Islands of the South Atlantic. 9 POLAR RECORDS 52-53 (1958). Significantly,
similar to Chile, Argentina's claim to Antarctica is based on rights purportedly inherited from Spain
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New Zealand,' Norway,9 ' and the United Kingdom92 filed wedge-shaped 93
claims of sovereignty94 antecedent to the Treaty negotiations. Five other
through the doctrine of uti possidetis. For an evaluation, see Hayton, The "American" Antarctic,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 603 (1956). Certainly, also not unimportant is the realization that both
Argentina's and Chile's claims overlap substantially with the claim of the United Kingdom. See
Moneta, AntarticaArgentina:Los problemasde 1975-1990, I ESTRATEGIA 5 (1975), and J. PUIZ,
LA ANTARTIDA ARGENTINA ANTE EL DERECHO (1960).
87. Australia claimed the area south of 60 degrees South latitude, between 45 degrees East and
160 degrees East, save for the interceding French sector running 136 degrees East to 142 degrees
East. This claim was activated through a February 7, 1933, Order in Council by the United Kingdom,
reprinted in 46 INT'L L. DOCS. 236 (1948-49 Compilation)(Publication of the Naval War College).
Australia formalized its claim in the Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act No. 8 of 1933,
located in I ACTS OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, 190 150, at 227 (1951).
88. Chile proclaimed its sovereignty over a sector situated 53 degrees West and 90 degrees West
in the Presidential Decree of November 6, 1940, reprinted in INT'L L. DOCS., supra note 87, at
224. Not insignificant is the fact that Chile traces its claim back to the 1493 papal Bull of Alexander
VI which, coupled with the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, divided up the New World between
Portugal and Spain. See Zegers, TheAntarctic System and the Utilization ofResources, 33 U. MIAMI
L. R. 427, 455-59 (1978). 0. PINOCHET DE LA BARRA, LA ANTARTICA CHILENA (4th ed.
1976); and 0. LABRA, CHILENOS EN LA ANTARTICA (1947).
89. The French sector, known as Adelie Land, covers the "island and territories situated south
of the 60-degree parallel of south latitude and between the 136-degree and the 142-degree meridians
of longitude east" and was articulated in the Presidential Decree of April I, 1938, reprintedin INT'L
L. DOCS., supra note 87, at 230-31. See also 1 G. HACKWORTH, I DIGEST OF INT'L LAW
459 (1940).
90. New Zealand's administative claim, known as the Ross Dependency, encompasses the area
from 160 degrees East to 150 degrees West and was made possible by a July 30, 1923, Order in
Council by the United Kingdom to the Governor of New Zealand. Reprinted in INT'L L. DOCS
supranote 87, at 235. For especially enlightening accounts, see generally F. AUBURN, THE ROSS
DEPENDENCY (1972) and L. QUARTERMAIN, SOUTH FROM NEW ZEALAND (1964).
91. Norway claimed sovereignty over Bouvet (Bouvetoya) Island on January 23, 1928, and over
Peter I Island on May 1, 1931. INT'L L. DOCS, supra note 87, at 238, 239. Presumably to obviate
the possibility of any German annexation in Antarctica, Norway claimed "[tihat part of the mainland
coast" between 20 degrees West and 45 degrees East (Queen Maud Land) by the Royal Proclamation
of January 14, 1939, reprintedin 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (Supp. 1940). Interesting to note, Norway's
claim does not extend seaward from glaciafirma Antarctica, and that even though a Norwegian,
Roald Amundsen, was the first explorer to reach the South Pole in 1911, Norway has made no legal
claim to that interior region. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 73, at 152-54.
92. The British claim, which was made in conjunction with the islands comprising the Falkland
Islands Dependencies, covered the area between 20 degrees West and 80 degrees West, below 50
degrees South, and was enunciated in a Letters Patent of July 21, 1908, reprinted in INT'L L.
DOCS, supra note 87, at 231-33. A subsequent Letters Patent of March 28, 1917, amended the
earlier claim to include 20 degrees West to 50 degrees West below 50 degrees South and in addition,
claimed the area from 50 degrees West to 80 degrees West below 50 degrees South. Id. at 233.
93. Configuration of the claims in Antarctica comport to the "sector theory," ostensibly first
devised by Captain J. Bernier in 1907 for Canada's claims in the Arctic. F. AUBURN supra note
84, at 19. While admittedly convenient, application of the sector theory in Antarctica is seriously
flawed in that: (a) geographically, Antarctica lacks appropriate baselines for drawing sectors; (b)
theoretically, claims could be advanced by Guatemala, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama,
Peru, Uruguay, and Brazil; (c) applying the sectorization notion to Antarctica contradicts accepted
modes of acquiring territory in international law; and (d) sectors could invite conflicts and disputes
over the legal validity to future sovereign claims. Id. at 23-31.
94. The acquisition of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica has long presented a complex dilemma
to international lawyers. In general, claims to Antarctic territory have been predicated upon three
doctrines: (1) discovery; (2) the sector theory; and (3) effective occupation. Argentina and Chile
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signators, Belgium, Japan, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and the United
States have neither made claims nor recognize the legal validity of those
which have been made. 95 These twelve States became the original "Consultative Parties" 96 to the Treaty, having demonstrated their "interest in
have also used geographical proximity (contiguity), geological affinity (i.e., the Gondwanaland
thesis) and succession to prior Spanish title (uti posseditis) as substantiation of their claims. See
notes 86-92 supra. "Effective occupation," which has long been recognized in international law as
a legitimate principle of acquiring title to territory is difficult to define and substantiate when applied
to Antarctica. For apt discussion and appropriate analyses, see Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica,
5 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 297 (1975); Carl, Claims to Sovereignty-Antarctica,28 S. CAL. L. REV.
386 (1955); Daniel, Conflict of Sovereignties in the Antarctic, 1949 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 241; Jain,
Antarctica: Geopolitics and InternationalLaw, 17 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L. AFF. 249 (1974); Wilson,
National Interests and Claims in the Antarctic, 17 ARCTIC 15 (1964); and F. AUBURN, supra
note 84, at 5-47.
95. For treatments of United States and Soviet interests in Antarctica, see F. AUBURN, supra
note 88, at 61-78, and 78-73, respectively; U.S. Antarctic Policy: U.S. Policy with Respect to
Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in the Antarctic: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oceans
and InternationalEnvironment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess
(1975); and Wolk, The Basis of Soviet Claims in the Antarctic, 5 BULL. INSTITUTE STUDY
U.S.S.R. 43 (1958).
96. The status of being a Consultative Party is key to how the Antarctic Treaty system operates.
In addition to the twelve original parties, only four states have been accorded Consultative Party
status since 1961: Poland in 1977, West Germany in 1981, Brazil in 1983, and India in 1983. These
sixteen nations meet periodically, approximately every two years, to approve recommendations aimed
at enhancing Treaty cooperation.
Important to realize, a "Contracting Party" is not synonymous with "Consultative Party," a status
which must be approved unanimously by the present Consultative Party Group. Non-Consultative
parties to the Antarctic Treaty presently include Czechoslovakia (1962), Denmark (1965), The
Netherlands (1967), Romania (1971), The German Democratic Republic (1974), Brazil (1975),
Bulgaria (1978), Uruguay (1980), Italy (1981), Papua New Guinea (1981), Peru (1981), Spain
(1982), and the Peoples Republic of China (1983). U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE
252 (1981). The blatant disparities between Consultative and Contracting Parties in benefits gained
versus costs paid are readily apparent. As F. Auburn cogently points out,
The Treaty itself imposes a number of obligations on Contracting Parties, but few
rights. Scientific information must be provided. Article IV prevents their making new
claims. Their consent is not required for amendment of the nuclear provisions. Only
Consultative Parties can nominate observers to carry out inspections. Contracting
Parties have to exert appropriate efforts to secure compliance with the principles and
purposes under Article X. Their agreement is not needed for amendment of the Treaty
at any time, although they are not bound by the amendment unless they have consented
to it. A review conference can only be called by a Consultative Party, and accession
by a non-member of the United Nations requires the unanimous consent of the Consultative Parties. The original signatories were given Consultative status permanently
without having to pass any test. Contracting Parties have to show substantial scientific
research, and may lose status if this requirement is not complied with. Benefits are
not large. In theory, scientific information is received. Exchange scientists are subject
to national jurisdiction only. Contracting Parties are entitled to take part in a review
conference. It will be pointed out that a State which is a Contracting Party has a legal
right, as against all the other parties, to enforce the general clauses, for example the
prohibition of military measures and nuclear explosions; but these rights are not backed
by any effective means of dispute resolution. The Treaty itself contains little incentive
for accession unless the nation concerned intends to become a Consultative Party, and
practice since 1961 has endorsed this conclusion.
F. AUBURN, supra note 84, at 170-71 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Hanerold, The Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meetings, 6 J. COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 183-99 (1971). Significant to note,
however, is that the Consultative parties invited the Contracting Parties to attend as observers the
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Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there,
such as the establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of a
scientific expedition." 97
The Antarctic Treaty is a multipurpose document, and embodies significant prescriptions calling for demilitarization,9 8 denuclearization, 99 and
only peaceful use of the continent; 1°° freedom from scientific research
and cooperation;'' on site inspection (after appropriate notification);'0 2
and, the obligation to settle disputes peacefully.)13 Of especial legal import, moreover, Article IV mandates that nothing contained in the Treaty
may be interpreted as renunciation, diminution, or support of a claim
made to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. In addition, no new claim
to territorial sovereignty may be asserted by the contracting parties while
the Treaty remains in force." ° For all intents and purposes, Article IV
legally froze the status quo ante of the seven pre-Treaty sector claims.
Importantly, it did so without qualifying or clarifying the legitimacy of
the claims' character under international law, or the potentially conflictual
ramifications they might portend for later resource exploitation."
XII biannual treaty meeting in Canberra, Australia, in September 1983. This is being viewed as an
attempt to foster a less furtive forum for Antarctic discussions, "a major departure from previous
Antarctic Treaty practice." Kimball, Unfreezing InternationalCooperationin Antarctica,The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 1, 1983, at 23, col. 1. Also see ISSUES BEFORE THE 38TH GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1983-1984 at 107, 109 (D. Puchala ed. 1983).
97. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 85, art IX (2).
98. Id. art. I.
99. Id. art V.
100. Id. Preambular para.
101. Id. art. I.
102. Id. art. II.
103. Id. art. XI.
104. In full, Article IV provides that:
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of
or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis or
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a
result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or nonrecognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim,
or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be
asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
Id. art. IV.
105. See text at notes 200-05 infra. Also see Bilder, The PresentLegal and PoliticalSituation
in Antarcticain Charney, supra note 2, at 167-205; Peterson, Antarctica: The Last GreatLand Rush
on Earth, 34 INT'L ORG. 377 (1980), Burton, New Stresses on the Antarctic Treaty: Toward
InternationalLegal Institutions Governing Antarctic Resources, 65 VA. L. REV. 421 (1979); Alexander, A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic Resource Problem, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371
(1978); and Note, Thaw in InternationalLaw? Rights in Antarctica Under the Law of Common
Space, 87 YALE L. J. 804 (1978).
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As set within the parameters of the Treaty, the principal thrust of
national activities over the past two decades has been evinced in scientific
research cooperation and environmental protection. Indeed, of the 132
recommendations unanimously adopted thus far by the Consultative Parties meeting in eleven conference sessions," °6 the vast majority have
related directly to those two basic concerns. In addition, two multilateral
instruments designed to conserve and protect Antarctic living resources
have grown out of the Treaty's Consultative Group process, the Agreed
Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora"0 7 in 1964
and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals in 1972.108
Nevertheless, the Antarctic Treaty neither provided a formal mechanism
nor stipulated any precise regulations for exploring or exploiting living
or non-living resources on the continent or offshore. Further, the Treaty
designated no rights or privileges for resource exploitation, nor did it
fashion pollution restrictions or create any specified husbandry standards
for safeguarding the environment. Expressed succinctly, while the Antarctic Treaty established a legal framework for Antarctic affairs, it failed
to deal in any substantive manner with issues regarding resource exploitation, management, or ownership.

Antarctic Resource Regimes and the Environment
Living Resources
Rapid improvement and advancement of marine resource harvesting
technology during the 1970s, "ocoupled with the overt absence of any
appropriate international law for adequate regulation, prompted the Consultative Parties in 1980 finally to address squarely the problem of managing marine resources in the Southern Ocean." 0 The composite product
of these discussions was a new agreement, the Convention on the Con106. Barnes, The Emerging Conventionon the ConservationofAntarcticMarineLivingResources:
An Attempt to Meet the New Realities of Resource Exploitation in the Southern Ocean, in Charney,
supra note 2, at 242. Prior to the Eleventh Consultative Meeting (1982), 127 recommendations had
been approved. For texts of the 118 recommendations adopted at the first nine consultative meetings,
see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HANDBOOK OF MEASURES IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY (2d ed. 1979). The nine subsequent
recommendations adopted in 1981 are reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE
TENTH CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY (1979).
107. Reprinted in F. AUBURN, supra note 84, at 304-310. Also see Guyer, supra note 84, at
193-97.
108. June 1, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 8826, reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251 (1972).
109. See generally Butler, Owning Antarctica: Cooperation and Jurisdictionat the South Pole,
31 J. INT'L AFF. 35 (1977).
110. Pallone, Resource Exploitation:The Threat to the Legal Regime of Antarctica, 10 CONN.
L. REV. 401 (1978); Mitchell & Kimball, Conflict Over the Cold Continent,35 FOREIGN POLICY
124 (1979); and Roberts, InternationalCo-operationfor Antarctic Development: The Test for the
Antarctic Treaty, 19 POLAR REC. 107 (1978).
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servation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources."' This multilateral instrument marked a significant step toward living resource management
for the Antarctic region, albeit one not without serious defects and deficiencies.
The ambit of the Convention's application is that region south of the
Antarctic Convergence. "2 The substantive essence of the treaty, however,
lies in Article II. It defines the primary objective to be conservation
(implicitly, "rational use")" 3 and sets out broad principles aimed at preserving the balance and interrelationships among harvested species."14
As with other fishery agreements," 5 the Convention establishes two
chief institutions: a Commission and a Scientific Committee. The
Commission" 6 is responsible for effectuating the Convention's objectives.
Accordingly, the Commission is charged with the obligations to facilitate
research, compile relevant biological data, ensure acquisition of catch
and effort statistics on harvested species, analyze, disseminate, and publish relevant scientific information, identify pertinent conservation needs,
"formulate, adopt and revise conservation measures on the basis of the
111. May 20, 1980, reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 837 (1980). As of September
1, 1982, the following States had ratified the Convention: Argentina, Chile, East Germany, West
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
U.S.S.R. The Convention entered into force on April 7, 1982.
112. Convention of Marine Living Resources, supranote 111, art. 1. The Antarctic Convergence
is a zone where the cold, low-saline waters of the Southen Ocean meet the warmer, higher-saline
waters of the southern parts of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Also known as the "Polar
Front Zone," the Antarctic Convergence is located between latitudes 50 degrees and 60 degrees
South.
113. Id. art. 11(2), at 842.
114. The conservation principles contained in Article II obligate Parties to ensure:
a) Prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to levels below
those which ensure its stable recruitment. For this purpose its size should not be
allowed to fall below a level close to that which ensures the greatest net annual
increment;
b) maintenance of the ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and
related populations of Antarctic marine living resources and the restoration of depleted populations to the levels defined in subparagraph (a) above; and
c) prevention of changes or minimization of the risk of changes in the marine
ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades, taking
into account the state of available knowledge of the direct and indirect impact of
harvesting, the effect of the introduction of alien species, the effects of associated
activities on the marine ecosystem and of the effects of environmental changes, with
aim of making possible the sustained conservation of Antarctic marine living resources.
Id. art. II (3), at 843.
115. For example, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with Schedule of
Whaling Regulators, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1976, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. An excellent
analysis of the IWC's efficacy is M'Gonigle, The "Economizing" of Ecology: Why the Big, Rare
Whales Still Die, 9 ECOLOGY L. Q. 114 (1980).
116. Convention on Marine Living Resources, supranote 111, at arts VII-XIII.
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best scientific evidence available,' 7 and implement the system of inspection provided for in the Convention." 8
The Scientific Committee will operate as a "consultative body to the
Commission. "' 9 The Scientific Committee serves primarily as a "forum
for consultation and cooperation concerning the collection, study and
exchange of information with respect to [Antarctic] marine living resources ... " 2' Furthermore, the Convention charged the Committee
with encouraging and promoting2 cooperation in scientific research through
a broad spectrum of activities. '
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources is not without flaws, however. These warrant notation. First, in
117. Id. art. IX (2). As specified, "conservation" measures include the following:
a) the designation of the quantity of any species which may be harvested in the
area to which this Convention applies;
b) the designation of regions and sub-regions based on the distribution of populations of Antarctic marine living resources;
c) the designation of the quantity which may be harvested from the populations
of regions and sub-regions;
d) the designation of protected species;
e) the designation of the size, age and, as appropriate, sex of species which may
be harvested;
f) the designation of open and closed seasons for harvesting;
g) the designation of the opening and closing of areas, regions or sub-regions for
purposes of scientific study or conservation, including special areas for protection
and scientific study;
h) regulation of the effort employed and methods of harvesting, including fishing
gear, with a view, inter alia, to avoiding undue concentration of harvesting in any
region or sub-region;
i) the taking of such conservation measures as the Commission considers necessary for the fulfillment of the objective of this Convention, including measures
concerning the effects of harvesting and associated activities on components of the
marine ecosystem other than the harvested populations.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. See id. art. XXIV.
Id. art XIV.
Id. art. XV.
Id. art. XV. As stipulated, the Scientific Committee is empowered to:
a) establish criteria and methods to be used for determinations concerning the
conservation measures referred to in Article IX of this Convention;
b) regularly assess the status and trends of the populations of Antarctic marine
living resources;
c) analyse data concerning the direct and indirect effects of harvesting on the
populations of Antarctic marine living resources;
d) Assess the effects of proposed changes in the methods or levels of harvesting
and proposed conservation methods;
e) transmit assessments, analyses, reports and recommendations to the Commission as requested or on its own initiative regarding measures and research to implement the objective of this Convention;
f) formulate proposals for the conduct of international and national programs of
research into Antarctic living resources.
Id. art. XV (2).
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order to activate the conservation standards set out in Article II, concerned
states must provide requisite financial, technical and political commitments, most particularly the chief harvesting States, Japan and the Soviet
Union. 122 Yet, no provision is made specifically for setting either national
catch quotas or effort restrictions. Moreover, a second difficulty rests in
the voting procedure. Given the "consensus" formula adopted (read to
mean "unanimity"), a single government could veto a catch allocation
proposed for consideration by the Commission. Inherent in consensus as
a policymaking approach, not surprisingly, is the risk of deadlock and
stalemate. The Commission couched a third fallacy in the binding nature
of an adopted conservation-oriented measure. If some member determines
that it is unable to accept such a decision, it may notify the Commission
within a certain time limit
23 of the objection, and thereby obviate being
bound by that measure.
A claims problem exists as well, perhaps the matter most difficult to
reconcile during the Convention negotiations. 124 Article IV of the proposed
agreement was the compromise product. It provides for a "bifocal" approach, i.e., one "which allows both claimants and nonclaimants to
interpret the same language differently regarding a claimant's right to
exercise coastal state jurisdiction off the continent and islands south of
60 degrees S." 11 Hence, though linking verbatim the Convention to the
Antarctic Treaty, Article IV does nothing to clarify explicitly the legal
nature or validity of the claims' status.
122. Barnes, supra note 106, at 243.
123. Convention on Marine Living Resources, supra note 111, at art. IX (6).
124. For an insightful treatment of the Convention negotiations, see Barnes, supra note 106, at
242-69.
125. Id. at 265 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Article IV of the Convention provides
in full
1. With respect to the Antarctic Treaty area, all Contracting Parties, whether or
not they are Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, are bound by Articles IV and VI of the
Antarctic Treaty in their relations with each other.
2. Nothing in this Convention and no acts or activities taking place while the
present Convention is in force shall:
a) constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial
sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area or create any rights of sovereignty in
the Antarctic Treaty area;
b) be interpreted as a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party
of, or as prejudicing, any right or claim or basis of claim to exercise coastal
state jurisdiction under international law within the area to which this Convention applies;
c) be interpreted as prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as
regards to recognition or nonrecognition of any such right, claim or basis of
claim;
d) affect the provision of Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Antarctic Treaty
that no new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica shall be asserted while the Antarctic Treaty is in force.
Convention on Marine Living Resources, supra note 111, at art IV. Cf. Article IV of the Antarctic
Treaty, supra note 104.
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The precise operation of the Scientific Committee was also left vague.
Whereas headquarters for the Commission was designated in Hobart,
Tasmania, Australia, 2 6 no permanent institution nor guaranteed access to
technical facilities were assured. Further, consensus voting required for
the Scientific Committee's budget could result in some harvesting nation
blocking allocations for research that favored lower quotas, thereby precluding implementation of appropriate conservation measures.
Difficulties of enforcement emerge as well. No centralized inspection
program exists for verifying compliance with conservation measures. The
overt omission of boarding, inspection, and prosecution in deference to
flag state enforcement conceivably could invite opportunities for miscreant activities. In a similar vein, the covenant provides little for dispute
settlement. Should some dispute arise between Contracting Parties over
application or interpretation of the Convention, Article XXV does obligate
them to "consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute
resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice." 2 7 Should
these efforts fail, resort should be made "with the consent in each case
of all parties to the dispute" to the International Court of Justice or to
arbitration.' 2 8 Compulsory dispute settlement, however, is ignored, as is
the possibility that a dispute could arise between a Contracting Party and
some other State or non-governmental entity.
Finally, a serious limitation of the Marine Living Resources Convention
lies in its rather narrow range and focus. As treated throughout the agreement, "conservation" is intended to mean "rational use," or wise harvesting practices.29 Yet, neither is the associated liability of vessel-source
pollution treated, nor are potential ecological problems stemming from
land-based activities ostensibly covered. In sum, the Convention's thrust
is to preserve the balance of Antarctica's present ecological system, not
to provide comprehensive protection from man-induced environmental
degradation. Consequently, while the Convention does mark a bold beginning in setting ecostandards for harvesting living marine resources in
the Antarctic region, it is merely that-just a beginning. 3
126. Convention on Marine Living Resources, supra note 111, art. XIII (1).
127. Id. art. XXV. This article is practically a verbatim transcript of the dispute settlement

provisions in Article XI of the Antarctic Treaty.
128. Id.

129. Id. art. II (2). See arts. IX, XI, XV, and XXIV.
130. Professor Auburn is less sanguine in his realpolitick assessment of the Convention. Posits
he:
To date the most significant action of environmental concern under the Antarctic
system has been the Living Resources Convention. Although the Conservation principles of the Convention would provide substantial protection for the marine ecothere will be serious obstacles to any attempt to promulgate measures
system ....
binding harvesting States contrary to their wishes. There is no specific funding
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Non-Living Resources
As alluded to earlier, the prospects for commercially recovering worthwhile hard minerals from Antarctica, even if discovered in mineable
quantities, are neither bright nor near-term. Serious obstacles of logistics,
onerous investment costs, and Antarctica's ice sheet effectively obviate
.for the foreseeable future any on-continent operations. On the other hand,
interest in hydrocarbon geology around Antarctica became stimulated in
1972 with the discovery of traces of methane, ethane and ethylene in
three of four holes drilled by the Glomar Challenger in the Ross Sea. 131
Notwithstanding sensationalist press reports at that time, 3 2 massive hydrocarbon deposits on the Antarctic continental shelf still remain speculative resources. Nevertheless, should some commercial exploration
proceed during the next decade, deleterious environmental consequences
could result, unless some action is taken to provide adequate ecological
forecasting and preventive legal measures.
Critical to appreciating the environmental liabilities associated with
exploiting non-living resources, especially hydrocarbons, in the Antarctic
is the physical nature of the local marine ecosystem. Offshore, Antarctica's continental shelf is relatively steep and narrow. Its seaward edge
drops off to a depth of 900 meters and the composite shelf area covers
approximately 4 million square kilometers. 33 For up to ten months of
the year, sea ice overlies nearly all the shelf, albeit during the austral
summer this breaks up into pack ice and flows northward. 134 As a result,
the multi-year accumulation of ice makes ship passage
in the Southern
35
Ocean extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. 1
Petroleum prospectors on the Antarctic continental shelf encounter unique
problems, to say the least. Ice coverage most of the year hampers or
mechanism for scientific research on krill stocks, and the Convention does not
prescribe catch levels or any other form of regulation. Krill trawling countries can
either veto conservation measures or individually refuse to accept them. The Scientific Committee is essentially under the direction of the Commission, which represents the political interests of States. Impact assessment in the municipal law sense
is not provided for under the regime, and even if the Scientific Committee were to
reach specific conclusions on, say, desirable catch levels, such findings would in
no way bind the Commission.
F. AUBURN, supra note 84, at 289.
131. See McIver, supra note 79.
132. E.g., Spivak, Frozen Assets?, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1974, at I; Shapley, Antarctica:World
Hunger for Oil Spurs Security Council Review, 184 SCIENCE 776 (1974); and Sullivan, Russians
Will Help U.S. in Drilling in Sea's Floor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 6. Compare
Auburn, Offshore Oil and Gas in Antarctica, 22 GER. Y. B. INT'L L. 39 (1977).
133. Zumberge, Mineral Resources and Geopolitics in Antarctica, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 68, 74
(1979).
134. See generally A. MILNE, OIL, ICE AND CLIMATIC CHANGE (1978).
135. Campbell, Oil and Ice in the Arctic Ocean: Possible Large Interactions 181 SCIENCE 56
(1973).
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precludes geological exploratory operations. Furthermore, icebergs of
tremendous size and draft present another hazard to exploration, especially
during the drilling stage. While smaller bergs could be pushed aside by
tugboats or icebreakers,' 36 the larger ones, some having dimensions in
excess of 70 by 100 kilometers 37 (or 4200 square miles), would pose
obvious dangers to drilling vessels or operational platforms. Additionally,
these larger bergs are so substantial in volume as to be capable of scouring
the ocean floor to water depths approaching 200 meters.' 38 As a result,
production wells in the Southern Ocean's iceberg-infested waters would
have to be constructed such that no structures were left protruding above
the seabed. Undoubtedly, too, local icebergs would loom hazardous to
tankers transporting petroleum from production wells offshore Antarctica
to elsewhere. In sum, James Zumberge stated it succinctly recently:
Thus, no matter how geologically attractive the continental shelves
of West Antarctica might appear, the combined hazards of severe
pack ice, prolonged storms of high intensity, and bottom-scouring
icebergs present technical difficulties of immense proportions for
anyone contemplating petroleum exploration and, ultimately, extraction in the high latitudes of the Southern Ocean.' 39
Implicit in these "technical difficulties" are the concomitant risks of oil
spillages and well blow outs which accompany any significant petroleum
production operation in the marine environment.
At present, commercial exploitation of Antarctica's petroleum potential
appears little more than futuristic speculation. Even so, the chances for
severe environmental damage remain real, and due consideration of these
dire possibilities, as well as the legal contingencies for preventing their
occurence, seems appropriate.
As of today, no international regime formally exists legally for ensuring
the protection, preservation, and conservation of Antarctica's marine environment. Nevertheless, some scenarios regarding an Antarctic mineral
regime are conceivable.
The Status Quo Scenario. The Consultative Parties of an Antarctic
Non-Living Resources Convention may promulgate an agreement as that
concluded in 1980 for living marine resources. 4 Clearly, this type of
instrument seems reasonable of anticipation, since the 1972 Seventh Ant136. Bruneau, Iceberg Towing for Oil Rig Avoidance, in ICEBERG UTILIZATION 379 (A.
Husseiny ed. 1978).
137. Swithinbank, Giant Icebergs in the Weddell Sea 1967-1968, 14 POLAR REC. 477-78
(1969).
138. POSSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECT OF MINERAL EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN ANTARCTICA 12 (J. Zumberge ed. 1979).
139. Zumberge, supra note 133, at 74.
140. See text at notes 110-130 supra.
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arctic Treaty Consultative Meeting adumbrated it. One direct product of
that gathering, Recommendation VII-6, publicly acknowledged the likelihood that exploitable minerals might exist within the Antarctic Treaty
Area. It noted the "need for further study and deliberation among the
Consultative Parties," and recognized that mineral exploitation conceivably could "raise problems of an environmental nature." 41
In 1977, the Consultative Parties demonstrated more concern when
they espoused unanimously a policy position aimed at dissuading mining
operations by their nationals or third party States within the regional
ambit of the Antarctic Treaty. To this end, paragraph (8) of Recommendation IX-1 formally proposed that these governments
urge their nationals and other States to refrain from all exploration
and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources while making progress towards the timely adoption of an agreed regime concerning
Antarctic mineral resource activities. They will thus endeavour to
ensure that, pending the timely adoption of agreed solutions pertaining to exploration and exploitation of mineral resources, no acThey
tivity shall be conducted to explore or exploit such resources.
142
will keep these matters under continuing examination;
Admittedly, this recommendation in strictu sensu does not entail a legal
moratorium among the Consultative Parties to abstain from conducting
exploration or exploitation resource activities in or around Antarctica.
Nor does it legally advocate or bind the Consultative Party Governments
to refrain from economically exploiting mineral resources in Antarctica's
maritime region. Notwithstanding this absence of legal constraints, Recommendation IX-1 still signaled a noteworthy turning point in the Consultative Parties' attitudes toward Antarctica's mineral resource development.
It not only highlighted the need for expert assessment of Antarctic environmental questions, 43 especially damage prevention,'" but also embodied four guiding principles endorsed by the Consultative Parties relating
to minerals in the region:
(i) the Consultative Parties will continue to play an active and responsible role in dealing with the question of the mineral resources
of Antarctica;
(ii) the Antarctic Treaty must be maintained in its entirety;
141. Certain recommendations of the Seventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, adopted
Nov. 10, 1972, Rec. VII-6, 28 U.S.T. 1138, T.I.A.S. No. 8500, reprinted in HANDBOOK OF
MEASURES, supra note 107, at 1501.
142. Certain recommendations of the Ninth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, adopted Oct.
7, 1977, Rec. IX-1, reprintedin HANDBOOK OF MEASURES, supra note 106, at 1503, 1504.
143. Id. para. 3.
144. Id. para. 3(ii). The deleterious impact of oil contamination was particularly singled out in
Recommendation IX-6. See HANDBOOK OF MEASURES, supra note 106, at 1107.
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(iii) protection of the unique Antarctic environment and of its dependent ecosystems should be a basic consideration;
(iv) the Consultative Parties, in dealing with the question of mineral

resources in Antarctica
45 should not prejudice the interests of all mankind in Antarctica. 1
The Consultative Parties' indicated continued concern over fashioning an
Antarctic mineral resources regime through Recommendation XI-1, adopted
by consensus in 1981 at the Eleventh Consultative Meeting. 146 This proviso recognized that "A regime on Antarctic mineral resources should be
concluded as a matter of urgency," reaffirmed the four guiding principles
enumerated above, '4" and called for convention of a Special Consultative
Meeting in order to elaborate such a regime and to schedule appropriate
future negotiations. 48 Further, while Recommendation XI-1 perpetuated
the nebulous claims situation, 149 due- consideration nevertheless was lev-

eled at requisite protection of Antarctica's areal environment from mineral

exploitation-related activities,"' as well as at guaranteed assessment and
research means for facilitating informed resource management and decision-making. '' Given these diplomatic initiatives, the Consultative Parties clearly are moving forthrightly toward negotiating a limited agreement
which establishes some kind of Antarctic mineral resource regulatory
mechanism. Presumably this regime at least will have hortatory provisions
for minimizing those exploitation activities capable of denigrating or

polluting Antarctica's circumpolar marine ecosystem.
The Condominium Scenario. A second foreseeable way of fostering an
environmentally conscious mineral regime for managing the Southern
Ocean is the evolution of a formal condominium schema on the Antarctic
145. Recommondation IX-l, supra note 142, at para. 8.
146. Para. 2, Recommendation XI-1 of the Final Report of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Antarctic Mineral Resources, reproduced as Appendix G in Charney, supra note
2, at 329, 330.
147. Id. at para. 5. In addition, the following fifth principle was appended:
(e) the provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty should not be affected by
the regime. It should ensure that the principles embodied in Article IV are safeguarded
in application to the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty.
Id. For the text of Article IV see note 104 supra.
148. Recommendation XI-1, supra note 146, at para. 3.
149. Paragraph 6 of Recommendation XI-1 stipulates that:
6. Any agreement that may be reached on a regime for mineral exploration and
exploitation in Antarctica elaborated by the Consultative Parties should be acceptable
and be without prejudice to those States which have previously asserted rights of
or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica as well as to those States which
neither recognize such rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica nor,
under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, assert such rights or claims.
Id. para. 6.
150. Id. para. 7.
151. Id. para. 7 (I, VII).
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continent. 52 Should imposition of ecological safeguards come to supercede priority considerations of national sovereignty and territorial aggrandizement, the claimant Consultative Parties hypothetically could opt
to abandon their individual sector claims in preference to a jointly administered continental regime. This scenario likely could permit closer,
more effective coordination of antipollution offshore policies. Moreover,
a principal attraction of this arrangement would lie in a more comprehensive regional approach for implementing policies of offshore mineral
and hydrocarbon resource development, while at the same time allowing
for concomitant protection of the Southern Ocean's environment. In addition, this regime of shared rights and responsibilities would resolve the
claims questions. Sector claims on the continent would be dissolved, and
the region could be governed cooperatively as a whole polity. Heightened
commercial attention in Antarctica very likely would stem directly from
unequivocable resolution of the sector claims' uncertain legal status. Private ventures correspondingly would incur less risk by investing in a
politically non-contentious legal situation. Aside from all these ostensible
advantages, political reality dictates that creation of an Antarctic condominium in the near term is remote at best. Whether claimant or nonclaimant, Consultative Party States have been and are still reluctant to
relinquish voluntarily their real or imagined sovereign interests in the
region. 153
The NationalizationScenario. Another relevant scenario could find the
Antarctic continent and its superjacent waters carved up among competing
States. Should the Antarctic Treaty regime collapse in the wake of failed
renegotiation proceedings,' 54 a likely reaction is apt to be reinvigorated
assertions of sovereign claims by States historically interested in the
region. 155 In that event, Antarctica and its environs legally would become
treated as terra nullius, i.e., territory belonging to no one and thus made
subject to national appropriation, with attendant rights of indigenous
resource exploitation. 156 The resultant national claims would gain legal
152. For a fuller treatment of this notion, see Rose, Antarctic Condominium: Building a New
Legal Orderfor Commercial Interests, MARINE TECH. SOC'Y J. 19 (Jan. 1976).
153. Reportedly, New Zealand has been the only State to posit publicly its willingness to give
up its claim if the other Claimant States did also. C. BEEBY, supra note 84, at 8-10.
154. Article XII provides that thirty years after the Treaty's entry into force (i.e., 1991) a
Conference may be called by a Consultative Party "to review the operation of the Treaty." Antarctic
Treaty, supra note 84, at Art. XII, para. 2(a).
155. Little question seems to exist that the United States and the Soviet Union would act to bolster
their respective national interests in the region. See F. AUBURN, supra note 84, at 61-83.
156. For the acquisition of territory to be legitimate, it must not be under the sovereignty of
another State at the moment of occupation. Compare Island of Palmas Case, (United States v.
Netherlands) 2 R INT'L ARB. AWARDS 829 (Penn. Ct. Arb., 1928), reprintedin 22 AM. J. INT'L
L. 867 (1928) with Affaire de l'Isle de Clippertons, 2 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1105 (1931) and
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, (1933) P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, reprintedin 3 M. HUDSON,
WORLD COURT REPORTS 148 (1934).
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validity, and concurrently promote legal acceptance of the Claimant States'
jurisdictional assertations and commercial activities in the region.
While national claims ultimately might engender the sound policies
for coastal resource management and offshore environmental protection
usually associated with national ownership and control of territory, they
quite possibly would also breed conflict and confrontation among vested
State interests. The headlong rush to grab sovereign territory in Antarctica
could not help but produce overlapping claims situations, with a concomitant high probability that disputes could be touched off among respective claimants. Predictably, the regrettable upshot of these circumstances
would relegate environmental preservation policies for the Southern Ocean
to only secondary, if indeed any substantive priority. Therefore, a continent earmarked by manifold national territorial claims could render the
integrity of Antarctica's seaward ecosystem vulnerable to contamination
and refuse cast off by multi-national regional competition.' 57
The "Common Heritage" Scenario. Conception of a minerals regime
for Antarctica and its coastal environs might also take a route similar to
that which occurred in the United Nations for the deep seabed.' 5 8 That
is, the United Nations General Assembly could declare the cold continent
and all circumjacent waters south of 60 degrees South latitude to be "the
common heritage of mankind."'5 9 If subsequently confirmed by State
conduct and accepted practice, this legal status would explicitly exclude
any exercise of national sovereignty or territorial rights over the Antarctic
area. Moreover, it would also preclude acquisition of all jurisdictional
prerogatives usually associated with sovereignty by any State, person, or
corporate entity vis-a-vis Antarctica's mineral resourdes. 6" Hence, the
157. Professor Rainer Lagoni alluded to this possibility when he observed,
To sum up, the prospects for nationalization of this continent are still dim because
the possibilities of living in Antarctica are still very limited, the territorial claims
are rejected by important Consultative Parties, and several claims are clouded by
competing claims of other States. On the other hand, with the growing possibility
of exploiting Antarctica's mineral resources, the threat of nationalization of parts
of this continent is increasing because commencement of mineral exploitation would
rapidly change living conditions in this continent. Antarctica would become habitable
and subject to effective occupation.
Lagoni, Antarctica'sMineral Resources in InternationalLaw, 39 ZETSCHRIFI FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1, 19 (1979).
158. See Pinto, The InternationalCommunity andAntarctica,33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475 (1978)
and Bilder, supra note 105, at 184, ff.
159. The precise legal status of such a U.N. declaration, however, remains highly polemical.
Compare e.g., J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
(1969) and 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1966) with Sloan, The Binding of a Recommendation of the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1948)
and Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. GeneralAssembly on Customary International
Law, 79 PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC'TY INT'L L. 301 (1979).
160. For general discussion on the jurisdictional nuances of the common heritage notion, see Van
Dyke & Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the High Seas": Which Governs the Seabed?,
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Antarctic area and its coastal resources legally would become res communis, i.e., territory common to all and therefore immune from national
appropriation. 6 '
Within the realm of suspectibility, the U.N. General Assembly might
declare the Antarctic to be a portion of "the common heritage of mankind," particularly given that body's recent pronouncements over the
deep seabed 6 ' and the moon. 63 Nevertheless, this type of proclamation
by the General Assembly would be more politically salient than legally
significant. General Assembly declarations and resolutions are merely
hortatory expressions, without full legally binding commitment. 61 Given
this fact, these recommendations do however entail consensus expressions
of the international community; consequently, they may at times foreshadow the course of acceptable legal conduct by States over the long
term. 165
Respective to Antarctic mineral resource development offshore, a
"common heritage of mankind" approach indubitably would be welcomed
warmly by the Group of 77 (i.e., the less developed countries) 166 and
vehemently resisted by the Consultative Parties (comprised primarily of
advanced industrialized nations).167 Concerning marine environmental
protection and preservation, theoretically the "common heritage" approach might appear quite desirable; in practice, however, it actually has
yet to be tested. In this regard, one unmistakable reality overwhelms
legalistic niceties: for the "common heritage of mankind" approach to
19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493 (1982). Larschan & Brennan, The Common Heritage of Mankind
Principle in InternationalLaw, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983) and Wolfrum, The
Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 43 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 312 (1983).
161. See J. KISH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 70-80 (1973).
162. See Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971). For appropriate commentary, see Adede, The System ofExploitation of the "Common
Heritage of Mankind" at the CaracasConference, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1975); Chamey, The
InternationalRegimefor the Deep Seabed: PastConflicts andProposalsforProgress,17 HARVARD
INT'L L. J. 1(1976); and see generally,INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEAAND THE FUTURE
OF DEEP SEABED MINING (C. Joyner ed. 1975).
163. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/1.113/Add.4 (1979), openedfor signature Dec. 18, 1979. Article XI provides in
relevant part that "The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind ......
Id., Art. XI, para. 1. See Christol, The Common HeritageofMankindProvisionin the 1979Agreement
Governing theActivities of States on the Moon and other CelestialBodies, 14 INT'L LAWYER 429
(1980). For the United States' reaction to the "Common Heritage" provision, see 115 Time, Mar.
24, 1980, at 47.
164. Joyner, U.N. GeneralAssembly Resolutions and InternationalLaw: Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation, 11 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 445, 452 (1981).
165. Id. at 463.
166. See generally, Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the UnitedNations: An Emergent
Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1979).
167. See notes 84-109 supra and accompanying text.
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attain political viability in the Antarctic environs, there must come wholesale participation and cooperation from the so-called developed States,
i.e., the Consultative Parties. Absent this genuine political commitment,
heralding Antarctica as a common legacy for all mankind will remain
merely a political chimera, a proclamation containing more rhetorical
sieve than legal substance.
Assessment
Increasingly over the past decade international attempts to curb intentional pollution of ocean space have been undertaken, albeit largely in
piecemeal fashion. Respective to the Southern Ocean's circumpolar waters,
only a modicum of direct legal concern and policy attention for antipollution protection thus far has been evinced. Under presently prevailing
politico-economic conditions this apparent neglect can be explained by
at least four mitigating circumstances. First, the region's barren desolation, austere isolation, and acutely inhospitable climate create glaring
logistical problems which, not surprisingly, have tempered enthusiasm
by commercial concerns for resource development there. Second, the corelated lack of efficient extracting technology, coupled with exorbitant
investment expenditures and the unsettling realization that only a paucity
if any lucrative deposits of exploitable mineral deposits could be found
in the Southern Ocean, have combined to depreciate that region's economic attractiveness. Simply stated, investment risks for resource exploitation in Antarctica currently are calculated to outweigh potential profit
returns. Hence, neither economic incentives for large scale Antarctic
resource exploitation nor a perceived pressing need for legally insulating
the marine area from potential pollution hazards are evidenced. Third,
though admittedly exclusive in design and composition, a legal regime
for administering the Antarctic environment already is in place and has
been accepted without legal challenge by the international community
since the Antarctic Treaty's inception in 1961. Fourth, even if massive
amounts of mineral resources were discovered, uncertainty over Antarctica's claims situation, exacerbated by unpredictable prospects for the
continent's legal status over the next two decades, renders investment
opportunities in the region at this time impractical and imprudent. In
short, a wait-and-see attitude is being taken by commercial developers
in preference to that of first come, first served.
ANTARCTICA, THE SOUTHERN OCEAN AND UNCLOS III
General Observations
Although Antarctica and its circumpolar Southern Ocean were neither
direct nor preeminent negotiated concerns during the Third United Nations
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Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the resultant Draft
Convention,16 should it enter into force, could produce some conflictual
and perhaps even legally entangling ramifications for Consultative Party
Governments. No argument exists that the negotiated 1982 UNCLOS III
Convention intentionally applies in scope to all ocean space, including
the Southern Ocean south of 60 degrees South latitude.
Nevertheless, what if some particular Consultative Party opted not to
participate formally in the UNCLOS III Convention? How would that
policy preference legally square with those other Consultative Parties who
adopted the UNCLOS III Treaty text? Moreover, and of greater pertinence
for this study, to what degree do the provisions in the UNCLOS III Draft
Convention affect, augment, supercede, or impinge upon provisions in
the Antarctic Treaty and, hence, the administrative regime now overseeing
activities throughout much of the Southern Ocean?
Considering the impending immediacy in time frame, comprehensive
answers to these queries at present remain elusively speculative, and likely
will be gleaned primarily from gradual state practice and behavior. Specifically relevant for Antarctica and its offshore marine ecosystem are at
least six broad law of the sea areas contained in the UNCLOS III Draft
Convention. Those sections pertain to (1) seaward territorial limits, (2)
resource management and conservation, (3) oceanic environmental protection, (4) marine scientific research, (5) deep seabed mining, and (6)
individual and archipelagic island regimes.
UNCLOS III's Relevance for Antarctica
TerritorialLimits
The inability to ascertain definitively the legal extent of territorial
possession, independence, and legitimate jurisdiction accrued by States
over claims in Antarctica suggests a singularly overt conclusion: Antarctica is neither a continent of sovereign coastal States nor a bona fide
condominium territory possessing a uniform coastline border. Without
acknowledged sovereignty or independence, Antarctica terrafirma apparently fails to qualify under international law, whether partitioned sectorially or taken in toto, as a recognized Coastal State. 69 Therefore, absent
these critical attributes, international legal acceptance of any territorial
sea, 17 contiguous zone,"' exclusive economic zone,"' or continental
168. UNCLOS II1Convention (1982), supra note 25.
169. For relevant discussion, see Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica, 21 VA.
J. INT'L L. 691 (1981).
170. UNCLOS In Convention (1982), supra note 25, at arts. 2-32.
171. Id. art. 33.
172. Id. arts. 55-75.
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"' that might be declared seaward from
shelf 73
Antarctica would be incredulous and highly suspect. Indeed, Antarctica's circumpolar waters customarily have been regarded by Claimants and non-Claimants alike as
being legally the status of high seas. 74 Ostensibly, then, all States would
possess traditional high seas freedoms in the Southern Ocean, including
rights of free navigation,' 75 overflight,'76 laying of cables and pipelines,' 77
fishing,' 78 and scientific research' 7 9 -activities qualified only by the requisite duty of conserving and protecting living resources in the region.' 8

Resource Management and Conservation
As discussed above, the Antarctic ecosystem teems with living resources and potentially may contain certain mineral resources."'8 Outside
the Consultative Party Group, pertinent international law for resource
exploitation throughout the South Ocean region will be derived in paramount part from the UNCLOS III Treaty package. All States will enjoy
the high seas right to fish in the region, subject to any prior treaty obligations and a stipulated duty to conserve living resources.' 8 ' Respective
to the latter, the "best scientific evidence available" should be employed
by States to ensure that a maximum sustainable yield level be maintained
for all harvested species.' 83 Given no recognized sovereign coastal State
exists in Antarctica, continental shelf exploitation could become highly
polemical. Geologically, a shelf prolongation is evident; legally, however,
its status remains nebulous and somewhat of a fiction. Consequently,
Antarctica's continental shelf entails a legal projection of the deep seabed
under the high seas, making it subject to the regulatory aegis of the
proposed International Seabed Authority." 4 Alternatively, Antarctica's shelf
might be considered legally analogous to that shelf area beyond 200
173. Id. arts. 76-85.
174. F. AUBURN, supra note 84, at 27.
175. The sector claims, save for Norway's, extend seaward from the continent to 60 degrees S.
latitude.
176. UNCLOS III Convention (1982), supra note 25, at arts. 87 and 90.
177. Id.arts. 87 and 112.
178. Id. arts. 87 and 116.
179. Id. arts. 87 and 119.
180. Id.arts. 117-120.
181. See notes 109-167 and accompanying text supra.
182. UNCLOS III Convention (1982), supra note 25, at arts. 116 and 117.
183. Id.art. 119.
184. Id. arts. 133-191. For discussion of the Authority, see T. KRONMILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING and the sources cited in note 162 supra. Comparede Soto,
The Developing Countries and Deep Seabed Mining: Problems, Prospectsand Policy Implications,
in Joyner, supra note 162 at 45, with Dubs, Law and Policy in Mining the Ocean Floor: The
Industrial Perspective, in Joyner, supra note 162, at 56.
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nautical miles, hence making the exploiting State liable for certain "payments and contributions" to the Authority. "5
EnvironmentalProtection and Preservation
The Antarctic marine ecosystem is both delicate and fragile. Moreover,
studies suggest that it is also heavily dependent upon krill organisms for
sustaining the balance of nature in the local food chain. 186 Successful
preservation and protection of the Southern Ocean's environment, therefore, retains preeminent concern, and States would be obligated under
the UNCLOS III treaty to restrain and control use of technologies in the
region.' 87 Additionally, they should refrain from pollution (whether it is
land-based 88 [i.e., from Antarctica], seabed-based,' 8 9 vessel-source,'9
dumping-source, w9 or atmospheric' 92 in origin) in order to protect the
environs' vitality. Though identified in the UNCLOS III Treaty merely
as the "competent international organization," presumably primary responsibility for monitoring pollution output and assessing the condition
of Antarctica's environment would be assumed by the United Nations
International Maritime Organization (formerly, the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization).
Maritime Scientific Research
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty is conspicuously noteworthy for promoting
international (albeit in fact only limited) cooperation in free scientific
investigation among the Contracting Parties. 93
' For non-Parties, however,
legal strictures for conducting marine scientific research in the Southern
Ocean are provided in Part XIII of the UNCLOS III Treaty text. States
and "competent international organizations' 94 are permitted to conduct
scientific research, so long as it is carried out for peaceful purposes and
does not interfere with "other legitimate uses of the sea.' 95 All States
also have the attendant legal right to conduct scientific research on the
local deep seabed and "in the water column beyond the limits of the
exclusive economic zone.' 1 96 Once again, because exclusive economic
185. UNCLOS III
CONVENTION (1982), supra note 25, at art. 82.
186. See text at notes 80-83 supra.
187. UNCLOS III Convention (1982), supra note 25, atart. 196.
188. Id.art. 207.
189. Id.art. 208.
190. Id.art. 211. See notes 17-55 supra.
191. Id.art. 210.
192. Id.art. 212.
193. Antarctic Treaty, supranote 84, at arts. II and III.
194. UNCLOS IIIConvention (1982), supra note 25, at art. 240.
195. Id.art. 240.
196. Id.art. 257.
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zones can not exist legally absent a sovereign coastal State, a logical
inference would allow scientific research sine consent 97 up to the edge
of Antarctica's continental land mass. Finally, while research installations
and related equipment in Antarctic waters are permissible, they can not
generate legitimate territorial jurisdictional limits, nor can they be construed legally as islands,1 98 or obstruct any international shipping lanes
in the proximate seas.'
Deep Seabed Mining
Though the amount has yet to be determined precisely, the abyssal
plains surrounding Antarctica are thought to be littered with manganese
nodule deposits. Consequently, for parties to the UNCLOS III Convention, these portions of the deep seabed (i.e., "the common heritage of
mankind") 2 would be subsumed under the jurisdictional purview of the
proposed International Sea-Bed Authority."' An interesting conundrum
potentially lies for the Antarctic Claimant States. Save for Norway's, all
sector claims to Antarctica extend from the South Pole outward to 60
degrees South latitude. (Great Britain's claim, in fact, reaches as far north
as 50 degrees South latitude.) While the Claimant States usually have
denied appropriation of juxtaposed high seas,202 they might attempt to
assert title to the sea floor below, particularly if a superabundance of
mineral wealth is proven to be there. Obviously, were this scenario to
occur, an overt conflict of interests would be created between Claimant
States and parties to the UNCLOS III Convention. No doubt, too, the
rub could become even more exacerbated if a Claimant State were simultaneously a contracting member of the UNCLOS III agreement.
Island Regimes
On both sides of the 60 degrees South latitude perimeter of the Antarctic
region are several significant islands and archipelagoes, including inter
alia, Macquarie Island (Australia); Peter I Island (Norway); the South
Shetland Islands (Argentina, Chile, and Great Britain); South Georgia
Island (Argentina and Great Britain); the South Orkneys (Argentina and
Great Britain); the South Sandwich Group (Argentina and Great Britain);
Bouvet Island (Norway); Prince Edward Island (South Africa); Crozet
197. Id. arts. 245-253.
198. Id. art. 259.
199. Id. art. 261.
200. Id. art. 136. See text at notes 159-167 supra.
201. Id. arts. 156-191. See Goodell, Marine Sediments of the Southern Ocean, in ANTARCTIC
MAP FOLIO SERIES (1973)(Folio 17).
202. F. AUBURN, supra note 84, at 27.
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(France); Kerguelen (France); and Heard Island (Australia). Notwithstanding some jurisdictional disputes over title, all of the above formations
do qualify as islands under the UNCLOS III draft's definition. 2 3 Accordingly, each is legally capable of generating a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone, and a continental shelf
delimitation. 4 Moreover, the South Shetlands, the South Orkneys, and
the South Sandwich Islands geographically and legally are considered
archipelagoes; hence, were they to qualify someday as independent States,
ostensibly then archipelagic baselines could be assigned, 0 5 internal waters
could be designated, 2' and the right of innocent passage through the
islands' waters could be supervised 20 7 or, if deemed necessary, suspended.2 8 Perhaps most noteworthy, proximate to these three archipelagoes, as well as to South Georgia Island and Bouvet Island, are impressive
concentrations of vast krill swarms. Not surprisingly, then, were 200 mile
EEZs to be declared seaward from these islands, local krill resources in
effect would become "nationalized" and appropriated by the islands'
respective possessor-claimant States.
Assessment
The present Antarctic Treaty regime could become susceptible to criticism or collision in the wake of an UNCLOS III Convention coming
into force. For Antarctic claimant states, the current system permits their
sector claims to exist seaward without subjecting their validity to substantive challenge. Application of pertinent UNCLOS Ili Treaty provisions to the Southern Ocean and its indigenous resources, whether living
or non-living, could alter that situation.
For States not party to the Antarctic Treaty or its related conventions,
the 1982 UNCLOS III Convention formally would allocate certain new
resource exploitation rights, as well as attendant responsibilities for regional protection of the Southern Ocean's marine environment. New legal
guidelines for territorial delimitation, resource management, environmental preservation, scientific research, and island regimes would be
enunciated and legally promulgated. Importantly, too, all these activities
assume direct relevance for the Southern Ocean in general and for the
marine area south of 60 degrees South latitude in particular. Of course,
203. The UNCLOS Il Convention defines an island as "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide." UNCLOS III Convention (1982), supra note
25, at art. 121.
204. Id. art. 121(2).
205. Id. art. 47.
206. Id. art. 50.
207. Id. art. 52.
208. Id.
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these novel aspects of emergent ocean law would apply just as meaningfully to all Consultative Parties and other Antarctic Treaty Contracting
States who eventually ratify the UNCLOS III Convention.
The recent law of the sea negotiations additionally highlight the pervasive concern throughout the international community for the health and
well being of common ocean space. In spite of its relatively desolate
isolatidn, the Southern Ocean looms as no exception to this consideration.
One might conclude therefore that this decade-long series of protracted
negotiations could mark a watershed for Antarctic politics. This would
be especially true if there were to surface a serious concerted effort in
the United Nations aimed at having Antarctica and the Southern Oceans
declared as "the common heritage of mankind," or perhaps in a politically
less extreme vein, as a world park administered under the Charter's
trusteeship provisions. 2" Doubtlessly cries of "world socialism" would
be voiced by various extractive industries in technologically advanced,
free-enterprise-oriented nations; yet, doubtless, too, absent unrestricted
intensive commercial development and exploitation of the Antarctic, eco209. An Antarctic Trusteeship arrangement could be provided through Article 81 of the U.N.
Charter. See COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, STRENGTHENING
THE UNITED NATIONS 207, 213-16 (1957) and Neider, To All Nations: Don't Have a Pack
Mentality, Keep AntarcticaPure, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1975, at 27, col. 1. Along these lines, James
Barnes has recently suggested the need for a trusteeship type of approach vis-a-vis the Antarctic
environs. Posits he:
... What would appear to be needed is a rational and equitable mechanism for
managing activities on the continent and in the surrounding seas in order to protect
interests and resources of importance to the entire international community. These
include freedom of scientific research, continued demilitarization of the region,
protection of the environment, preservation of endangered species, maintenance of
the potential food production for future generations, and prevention of adverse
climatic change due to human activities. Perhaps what is required is a new approach
to the question of resource ownership and control of resource exploitation in the
Antarctic area, one that would be consistent with the history of involvement in the
region by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, the interest of the international
community of nations, and with conservation and protection values.
Such an approach would require (1) that both claimants and nonclaimants renounce
any territorial claims they have asserted or might assert in the future, (2) that an
increasing number of other nations be invited to participate in Antarctic decisionmaking along with the existing Treaty Parties, (3) that the interim trustees explicitly
take into consideration the interests of the international community in all decisions,
particularly those regarding access to, utilization and protection of resources, (4)
that all future deliberations be conducted in the open, (5) that representatives of
appropriate international and nongovernmental organizations be invited to participate
as members or observers, (6) that the technology for exploiting resources of the
Antarctic be made available on a fair basis to interested countries or appropriate
international authorities once it is determined that such use is environmentally safe,
and (7) that the Southern Ocean and the continent of Antarctica, except for 200mile zones around islands north of 60 degrees S as to which there is no dispute
over sovereignty, be declared a common heritage area.
Barnes, supra note 106, at 269-70 (emphasis in original).
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logical protection and preservation of the region will be objectives far
easier to reach and effectively sustain.
CONCLUSION
This study has sought to examine critically the nature of maritime
pollution and the threat it poses to common space resource regimes,
especially that of the Southern Ocean. As a deleterious phenomenon,
marine pollution continues to occur, in spite of ongoing international legal
attempts to curtail such activities. Both vessel-source and land-based
waste effluents persist in finding their way into the oceanic ecosystem.
If left unabated by industry or unattended without restrictive international
legal fiat, they surely will continue to do so.
On another tack, the Antarctic's regional environment today remains
relatively pristine and unadulturated by man's toxic wastes. This pristine
condition is attributable to acts of commercial omission rather than to
international legal commission. In other words the harshly inhospitable
quality of life in the Antarctic, aggravated by tremendous logistical obstacles and overburdening technological investment costs, have worked
thus far to make the region commercially unattractive for resource development. Just how long this situation of lethargic interest and nonincentive will last, however, remains another question to be answered.
Nothwithstanding legitimate doubts about natural resource availability
there, in the coming decade Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are bound
to receive increasing economic, strategic, geopolitical, and legal international attention. The decisive consideration turns on whether international regulatory regimes for the region can be suitably fashioned, effectively
implemented, and legitimately accepted before widespread exploitation
and commercial activities begin.
Encouragingly, some movement in this direction has been evidenced
in recent policy initiatives by the Consultative Parties, as well as by the
international community through the UNCLOS III Convention conduit.
Nevertheless, the degree to which this institutional challenge is met effectually will also mirror the extent to which marine pollution in the
Antarctic ecosystem is adequately deterred. This assertion must retain
some priority as a preeminent, constant concern of international law, if
for no other selfless reason than to preserve some part of the world's
environment for succeeding generations.

